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Comments
Solar Rights:
Guaranteeing a Place in the Sun
The diagnosis of the U.S. energy crisis is quite simple:
demand for energy is increasing, while supplies of oil and
natural gas are diminishing. Unless the U.S. makes a timely
adjustment before world oil becomes very scarce and very ex-
pensive in the 1980s, the nation's economic security and the
American way of life will be gravely endangered. The steps
the U.S. must take now are small compared to the drastic
measures that will be needed if the U.S. does nothing until it
is too late.'
-President Carter's National Energy Plan
Although many of the specific proposals contained in the President's
National Energy Plan are controversial, the factual predicates under-
lying the need for a national energy policy are indisputable: the de-
mand for energy continues to increase, while known reserves decrease.
Curtailments, shortages, and increased dependence on foreign energy
resources are becoming the rule rather than the exception. Disagree-
ment on these premises focuses on the timetable of depletion, rather
than the fact that it will occur.
2
1 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN, at vii
(1977).
2 The variations in the predictions of the life expectancy of the remaining fos-
sil fuel reserves result at least partially from the lack of agreement on the criteria
to be used to determine the critical point in fossil fuel consumption. The CIA,
for example, forecasts that, "[b] y 1982 or 1983, sizable price increases are inevita-
ble unless large-scale conservation measures cut demand sharply." CENTRAL IN-
TELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY SITUATION: OUTLOOK TO
1985, at 18 (1977). Projected world demand for oil and natural gas will "substan-
tially exceed capacity by 1985." Id. at 1. These forecasts are supported by a recent
study conducted under the auspices of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
by energy-company analysts from fifteen countries. N.Y. Times, May 17, 1977,
at 1, col. 3.
On the other hand, the Director of Shell Oil Company's British subsidiary
focuses on the point at which absolute production will begin to decline, rather
than the point at which demand will exceed supply. He argues that production
will not peak until 1990. Address by G. Chandler to The Manchester Statistical
Society, Manchester, England (Nov. 9, 1976), reprinted in Political and Eco-
nomic Factors Governing Access to Energy in the Decades Ahead: Hearing Be-
fore the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
24 (1977).
A Stanford Research Institute study, while eschewing a prediction, states the
central problem: "[I]f one assumes that the earth's fossil fuels will last 1000
years at today's consumption rate . . . this same resource base would be con-
sumed in 104 years" at the current rate of growth of energy consumption. DIvi-
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To meet the projected world shortages of oil and natural gas, the
President has proposed a program that includes both conservation
measures to reduce demand and incentives to stimulate the production
and utilization of other energy resources.3 Of the alternatives suggested,
solar energy4 offers four unique advantages: it is nondepletable, 5 eco-
nomically competitive in life-cycle costs,6 nonpolluting, 7 and techno-
SION OF SOLAR ENERGY, ENERGY RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION,
SOLAR ENERGY IN AMERICA'S FUTURE: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 3 (1977)
(DSE-115/1) [hereinafter cited as STANFORD STUDY]. For a similar analysis, see
D. MEADOWS, D. MEADoWs, J. RANDERS, & W. BEHRENS, THE LIMITS TO GROWTH
(paper ed. 1972).
s For a short summary of these proposals, see National Energy Policy (Fact
Sheet), 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 573-83 (Apr. 20, 1977).
4 While all of the earth's energy resources except nuclear energy are indirect
forms of solar energy, for the purposes of this Comment "solar energy" is limited
to that energy radiated through the electromagnetic spectrum from the sun. It
includes energy produced in the form of heat (photothermal energy) and elec-
tricity (photovoltaic energy) caused by the direct action of insolation on manmade
collecting devices. Other, less direct forms, such as aeolian energy, biomass con-
version, and ocean thermal conversion, are not included.
In addition, this Comment focuses on the legal problems likely to be encoun-
tered by solar energy systems installed for personal use. The problems facing
public utility installations differ from those faced by individuals due primarily to
the availability of eminent domain powers.
5 Sunlight is the only source of energy that is an incoming flow rather than a
static supply. "The stable, long term supply of energy from the sun is more abun-
dant than all other sources of energy as well as longer lasting. For example, the
solar energy striking the earth's outer atmosphere in one month is equivalent to
that estimated to be stored in all fossil fuel resources." 9 STANFORD RESEARCH IN-
STITUTE, ENERGY SUPPLY AND DEMAND SITUATION IN NORTH AMERICA TO 1990:
ENERGY TECHNOLOGY 213 (1973) (Project No. ECC-2177) [hereinafter cited as
ENERGY TECHNOLOGY]. See also F. DANIELS, DIRECT USE OF THE SUN'S ENERGY
14-16 (paper ed. 1964) ; Lof, Solar Energy: An Infinite Source of Clean Energy,
410 ANNALS 52 (1973). The primary limitations on the use of solar energy are
its intermittent and diffuse nature. See notes 17-24 and accompanying text infra.
6 Due to its capital intensive nature, all comparisons of solar and traditional
costs must be made in terms of the life-cycle costs of both systems. The cost of the
initial investment and the projected cost of supplemental fuels must be averaged
over the expected life of the solar energy system and be compared with the pro-
jected costs of traditional fuels over the same period.
While its competitiveness with traditional fuels is affected by a number of vari-
ables, two are of primary importance: interest rates and fossil fuel costs. Al-
though the sun provides an essentially free source of fuel, solar energy systems
require a substantial capital investment for collectors and storage facilities. Due to
the necessity of this capital investment, interest rates have a substantial impact
on the use of solar energy. A recent congressional study concluded that the eco-
nomic "feasibility of solar energy can be determined almost solely by interest
rates." JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., THE ECONOMICS OF
SOLAR HOME HEATING 84 (Comm. Print 1977). The effect of interest rates can,
however, be reduced substantially by government subsidies or tax incentives such
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logically feasible.8 Solar energy can have a substantial impact on the na-
tion's energy requirements; the Energy Research and Development
as those proposed by President Carter. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
supra note 1, at xiii.
Despite high interest rates, as fossil fuel costs have risen solar energy has be-
come an increasingly competitive alternative. The degree of competitiveness,
however, varies with the use to which solar energy is put. Solar water heating,
for example, is presently less expensive than traditional fuels, assuming an after-
tax interest rate of 8.5%. JOINT ECONOMIC COMm., supra at 11. Solar space heat-
ing is also approaching cost competitiveness:
Based on comparison with conventional energy costs, . . . solar space
heating installed at an equivalent system cost of $20 per square foot of
collector is competitive today against electric resistance systems
throughout most of the U.S. . . . [I]f the cost should be reduced to
$10/ft2 by 1980 through a combination of technical innovations and
incentives, solar hot water and heat would be economically competi-
tive against all residential fuel types.
DIVISION OF SOLAR ENERGY, ENERGY RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRA-
TION, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SOLAR WATER AND SPACE HEATING, at iii (1976)
(DSE 2322-1). See generally Ben-David, Schulze, Balcomb, Katson, Noll, &
Thayer, Near Term Prospects for Solar Energy: An Economic Analysis, 17 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 169 (1977).
Photovoltaic generation of electricity with silicon cells is not, however, eco-
nomically competitive. Such systems now require a capital investment of approxi-
mately $50,000 per kilowatt, as compared with $220 per kilowatt for an equivalent
gas turbine system. STANFORD STUDY, supra note 2, at 26. The cost of silicon cells
may, however, be directly related to the total volume of production, as was the case
with the analogous silicon transistor. The cost of these transistors dropped from
over $25 to less than $.75 per unit between 1954 and 1968. ENERGY TECHNOLOGY,
supra note 5, at 232. A similar cost reduction in the production of silicon cells is
already evident. Between 1958, when 0.5 watts of cells were produced, and 1969,
when 105 kilowatts of cells were produced, the cost per watt dropped from $1,000
to $100. A. MEINEL & M. MEINEL, APPLIED SOLAR ENERGY: AN INTRODUCTION
28 (1976). ERDA estimates that within this decade the cost of silicon cells should
approach $100 to $300 per kilowatt. DIVISION OF SOLAR ENERGY, ENERGY RE-
SEARCH & DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, PHOTOVOLTAIC CONVERSION PROGRAM:
SUMMARY REPORT 1 (1976) (ERDA 76-161).
Economic factors may not, however, be the most important incentives induc-
ing individuals to shift to solar energy. Among other factors that may play an
important role are the decentralized, democratic nature of sunlight which fulfills
the general desire to personally control technology as well as ethical considera-
tions: "Many persons perceive solar energy as ethically preferred to other energy
sources. For this reason, they are willing to pay more and/or tolerate lower per-
formance. . . . Although this choice is difficult to quantify into system cost, it
is nonetheless real." STANFORD STUDY, supra note 2, at 32.
7 Pollution is an unavoidable concomitant of the use of all fossil and nuclear
fuels. Potential pollution from solar energy, on the other hand, is limited primarily
to contamination of water supplies through a leakage of the heat transfer medium,
such as ethylene glycol (antifreeze), employed in the collector. See generally 1
ENVIRONMENTAL & RESOURCE ASSESSMENTS BRANCH, DIVISION OF SOLAR ENERGY,
ENERGY RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, SOLAR PROGRAM ASSESS-
MENT: ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS-SOLAR HEATING AND COOLING OF BUILDINGS
[Volume 57, 1977]
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Administration estimates that by 2020 the sun could provide at least
25% of the nation's energy.9
Solar energy, however, is not restricted to use in the future. The
number of solar installations in this country has increased significantly
since 1975.10 If the tax incentives included in the President's proposals
are enacted, the number of buildings heated or cooled by solar energy
could increase even more rapidly."
Despite the social and economic advantages of solar energy, numer-
ous impediments to its wider use remain. For example, building codes
frequently hinder adoption of new construction technologies, 12 zoning
regulations may require an inefficient location of the collectors,' 3 and
(1977) (ERDA 77-47/1). In addition, the pollution caused by the energy required
to produce and fabricate solar energy systems is only four percent of that which
would be produced by using the fossil fuels saved by the system. STANFORD STUDY,
supra note 2, at 52-53.
An economy based on solar energy would also have other advantages. For ex-
ample, conversion to solar energy would create more jobs because fossil and
nuclear energy have been used primarily to replace human energy. Solar tech-
nologies provide approximately 2.5 times more jobs per unit of energy than nuclear
technologies. S. LAITNER, THE IMPACT OF SOLAR AND CONSERVATION TECHNOLO-
GIES UPON LABOR DEMAND (1976).
8 While solar energy can be employed in a wide range of applications, tech-
nology is most advanced in providing energy to heat water to be used either direct-
ly or for space heating. See notes 25-27 and accompanying text infra. If the tech-
nological problems of mass production can be solved, silicon cells will be widely
used. See note 6 supra.
9 Even if solar energy is confined to residential water and space heating it can
make a significant contribution to this country's energy requirements. Residen-
tial energy use consumes 25% of the nation's total energy demand. STANFORD
STUDY, supra note 2, at 11. Space and water heating use 86.9% of the energy used
in the residential sector. I FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION, PROJECT INDE-
PENDENcE TASK FORCE REPORT: RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL ENERGY USE
PATTERNS 1970-1990, at 8 (1974).
10 In 1975 only 183 homes were heated by the sun; the number of solar water
and space heating systems in this country now approaches 10,000. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 16, 1977, § 1, at 5, col. 1.
11 The President has proposed tax credits and incentives to encourage the use
of solar energy in more than 2.5 million homes by 1985. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at xiii.
12 'Solar energy systems do not readily fit within [local building officials']
experience, education, or in some cases, ability. The likelihood of excessive or
unreasonable safety, health, or materials requirements is highly probable." Re-
gion IX Counsel's Office, Federal Energy Administration, The Legal and Insti-
tutional Barriers to Solar Development: A Summary of the Issues 3 (1976)
(copy on file with the Oregon Law Review). See generally Rivkin, Courting
Change: Using Litigation to Reform Local Building Codes, 26 RUTGERS L. REv.
774 (1973).
13 American Bar Foundation, Proceedings of the Workshop on Solar Energy
and the Law 16 (Feb. 10, 1975), reprinted by National Technical Information
Service, U.S. Dep't of Commerce (Mar. 1975) (Pub. No. PB-241 051).
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present lending and security methods may be insufficient to finance solar
installations.1 4 Perhaps the fundamental legal impediment, however,
is the lack of a guarantee of continuing access to insolation, that is, ac-
cess to incident solar radiation. 5
Potential owners of solar energy systems are unlikely to make the sub-
stantial capital investment required to utilize solar energy unless they
can prevent shadowing of the collectors by structures or vegetation'0
14 Region IX Counsel's Office, supra note 12, at 18-20; American Bar Founda-
tion, supra note 13, at 11-13. Lending problems may be particularly acute if there
is no guarantee of solar access because lending institutions may either refuse to
lend funds for a potentially unusable solar energy system or may require a more
costly backup heating system. This problem may, however, remain largely theo-
retical. The Department of Housing and Urban Development has recently issued
standards for solar energy systems. These standards are the minimum require-
ments for all housing on which the federal government will insure the financing.
The standards recognize the potential shading problems, requiring that solar
buildings "relate well to . . .. [e]xisting and proposed site elements such as
vegetation, fences, landforms and buildings" in order to "minimize the shading of
the collector." 5 U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, INTERMEDI-
ATE MINIMUM PROPERTY STANDARDS: SOLAR HEATING AND DOMESTIC HOT WATER
SYSTEMS S-303-1(d), Commentary (1977). The standards do not, however,
require the builder to purchase a solar easement or take other steps to prevent
access problems.
15 This problem is beginning to attract comment. See, e.g., Eisenstadt & Utton,
Solar Rights and Their Effect on Solar Heating and Cooling, 16 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 363 (1976) ; Moskowitz, Legal Access to Light: The Solar Energy Imperative,
9 NAT. RESOURCES LAW 177 (1976) ; Comment, The Allocation of Sunlight: Solar
Rights and the Prior Appropriation Doctrine, 47 COLO. L. REv. 421 (1976).
The lack of a guarantee to solar insolation is not the only legal impediment to
the use of solar energy. One study has identified seven other areas in which the
legal system must be changed if it is to promote rather than hinder solar energy
utilization. Among these impediments are optimizing the location of solar collec-
tors, improving the public economics of solar energy systems, removing poten-
tial construction and maintenance problems, improving the climate for financing
solar energy systems, improving the operation and design of systems through
feasible energy backup, and utility concern with solar energy. Robbins, Law and
Solar Energy Systems: Legal Impediments and Inducements to Solar Energy
Systems, 18 SOLAR ENERGY 371, 372-73 (1976).
16 In addition to manmade structures, trees and other vegetation present po-
tential difficulties for a solar owner. It is well settled that the mere maintenance
of nonencroaching vegetation, in the absence of special circumstances, is not ac-
tionable. E.g., Merriam v. McConnell, 31 Ill. App. 241, 175 N.E.2d 293 (1961) ;
Cannon v. Neuberger, 1 Utah 2d 396, 268 P.2d 425 (1954). The obstruction of light
is not a special circumstance: "In so far as the bill alleges a deprivation of air and
light by reason of height of this shrubbery, or seeks an order to cause its removal
or limit its height, the bill is without equity." Granberry v. Jones, 188 Tenn. 51,
54, 216 S.W.2d 721, 722 (1949). Thus, in the absence of a recognized right to sun-
light, the owner of a solar energy system is without a remedy. Throughout this
Comment, shadow-casting objects will be referred to as "buildings," "structures,"




on the adjoining land. Therefore, if the increased use of solar energy
is desired, a solar right must be created.
In analyzing this problem, this Comment presents four related ex-
aminations. First, the minimum content of an effective guarantee or
solar right is determined. Second, the countervailing policy factors are
delineated and resolved. Third, current legal doctrines are examined
to ascertain if they are capable of providing the requisite solar right.
Fourth, alternative methods of protecting this right are examined.
Through the analysis, this Comment builds a case for legislative or
judicial action to resolve the problem.
I
FORM AND CONTENT OF A SOLAR RIGHT
In order to determine the characteristics of a solar right, a short
technical digression is necessary. Without a basic knowledge of the na-
ture of solar energy and the operation of solar energy systems, it is
difficult to specify the essential nature of the right. Just as water law,
for example, is dependent upon the physical attributes of water, solar
energy law must be based upon the properties and utilizations of solar
energy.
A. Characteristics of Solar Radiation
The sun emits energy in the form of wave particles through the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum. While the wavelengths of this energy cover a
broad band of the spectrum, solar energy systems can capture the en-
ergy from only a narrow group of wavelengths that roughly correspond
to those of visible light.
17
Legally, two aspects of solar radiation are of dominant importance:
it is both variable and diffuse. The energy content of solar radiation,
while almost constant above the earth's atmosphere,18 varies greatly
at the surface in both intensity and availability. These variations are
dependent primarily upon five factors: the hour of the day, 19 the day
17 Visible light is between 0.4 millionths and 0.8 millionths of a meter in wave-
length. Useable solar energy, on the other hand, can be recovered from a broader
band ranging from 0.3 millionths to 10 millionths of a meter. F. DANIELS, supra
note 5, at 17. The energy intensity of the radiation is not, however, continuous
across this band; over 907o of the energy is transmitted between 0.4 millionths
and 1.7 millionths of a meter. A. MEINEL, supra note 6, at 44.
18 There are small variations in exoatmospheric solar radiation due to the
earth's elliptical orbit. The seasonal differences vary between -3.27% at the
aphelion (July) and +3.42% at the perihelion (January). A. MEINEL, supra note
6, at 40-41.
19 The lower the sun is in the sky relative to the collecting surface, the greater
the air mass through which the radiation must pass. The size of the air mass is
inversely related to the energy intensity because the atmosphere absorbs and scat-
ters the energy. Id. at 45-46.
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of the year, 20 the atmospheric conditions, 21 the latitude, 22 and the alti-
tude23 of the collector. In addition, even under optimum conditions,
solar energy is extremely diffuse. The intensity of direct sunlight is
less than one percent of that obtained in fossil-fuel-fired boilers.
2 4
The effect of the variable and diffuse nature of solar radiation is that,
in order to collect enough energy to be practical, the collecting surface
must be exposed to the maximum amount of available sunlight. Thus,
access to solar energy throughout the major part of winter days is
required if this energy resource is to contribute significantly to the
energy requirements of the structure which it is to serve.
B. Requirements of Solar Energy Systems
Solar energy systems are designed to capture the energy in solar
radiation and transform it into heat or electricity. This requires four
components: access to direct insolation, a mechanism to capture and
convert the energy into the desired form,2 5 a medium for transporting
the product,
2 6 and a method of storing the energy.
27
From a legal perspective, the most important requirement of a solar
20 The inclination of the earth's axis relative to the sun results in the sun being
highest in the sky in the northern hemisphere on June 21 and lowest on December
21. The effect of this variation is a reduction in both the amount of sunlight, due
to fewer hours of sunlight, and the intensity of the available energy, due to at-
mospheric scattering and absorption. Thus the available sunlight is approximately
56% less on December 21 than June 21 at 430 north latitude. F. DANIELS, supra
note 5, at 21.
21 Besides the obvious impact of clouds on available energy, air pollution also
has a significant effect, cutting energy intensity by 15-20%. G. DANIELS, SOLAR
HoMES AND SUN HEATING 15 (1976). See also Peterson & Flowers, Interaction
Between Air Pollution and Solar Radiation, 19 SOLAR ENERGY 23, 31 (1977).
22 During winter the intensity of solar energy increases as a collector is moved
toward the equator. At solar noon the energy available at 30 ° latitude is more
than twice that available at 450 latitude. A. MEINEL, supra note 6, at 92-93.
23 The reduction in the volume of atmosphere above the collector results in an
increase of 15.4% in available energy per kilometer of elevation. Id. at 45-46.
24 ENERGY TECHNOLOGY, supra note 5, at 214.
25 The diffuse and variable nature of solar radiation requires a substantial col-
lector surface area. For space and water heating, two main types of collectors
are available: flat-plate and focusing collectors. The flat-plate collector is basically
a black surface, provided with a transparent cover and insulated on its sides and
rear. The transport medium is circulated over the surface, being warmed in the
process. See generally F. DANIELS, supra note 5, at 37-42; A. MEINEL, supra note
6, at 413-58. Focusing collectors use either lenses or parabolic mirrors to concen-
trate the solar radiation before heating the transport medium. F. DANIELS, Supra
note 5, at 42-50.
26 Either water or air can be used to transfer the heat to storage.
27 Heat may be stored in an enclosed container of rocks, a water storage tank,
or in certain salts which will melt and resolidify within the desired temperature




energy system is the necessity of access to direct insolation. While some
solar collectors can capture energy from diffuse or scattered radiation,
the potential recoverable energy from this source is quite low.2 8 Thus,
to be effective, the collector must be ensured of a continuing supply of
direct solar radiation.
C. The Analytical Basis of a Solar Right
The common law currently recognizes a property interest in light.
The United States Supreme Court, for example, has stated that it is
established "beyond question" that "easements of light, air, and [phys-
ical] access . . . are as much property" as the land itself.2 9 Except
in a very few instances, however, a landowner has a right to receive
light only from the area that is superj acent to the boundaries of the land;
that is, the right extends only to sunlight that reaches the surface ver-
tically.30 But the insolation that falls vertically is, in most instances,
diffuse rather than direct insolation because direct insolation reaches
the surface at an oblique angle. A landowner thus has a right to only
a limited amount of illumination.
Light as illumination, however, must be distinguished from light as
an energy resource. While diffuse light is acceptable as illumination, for
example, it is unacceptable as a source of energy. It is this require-
ment of direct insolation that differentiates a solar right from other
property interests in light.3 1 But the amount of direct insolation at any
location and time is limited. Scarcity thus imposes upon society the
necessity of a choice. The problem that must be resolved is essentially
one of allocating a natural resource among competing uses. Studies have
indicated that legal rules have a substantial impact on the allocation of
resources, most significantly through the recognition and enforcement
28 The ratio of energy intensity in diffuse sunlight to direct insolation varies
from 8% for deserts to 22% for urban areas. A. MEINEL, supra note 6, at 47. See
also Tuller, The Relationship between Diffuse, Total and Extra Terrestial Solar
Radiation, 18 SOLAR ENERGY 259 (1976).
29 Muhlker v. New York & H. R.R., 197 U.S. 544, 571 (1905). The law has
recognized property interests in illumination that arise prescriptively (see notes
61-71 and accompanying text infra), through implication (see notes 72-77 and ac-
companying text infra), as incidents of the ownership of lots abutting a public
street (see notes 78-80 and accompanying text infra), and contractually between
adjoining landowners (see notes 81-92 and accompanying text infra).
30 This conception is embodied in the common-law maxim: Cujus est solum,
ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos ["To whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns
also to the sky and to the depths." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 453 (4th ed. 1951) ].
See generally Ball, The Vertical Extent of Ownership in Land, 76 U. PA. L. REv.
631 (1928).
S1 This distinction is also the primary limitation on the utility of current legal
theories which guarantee rights to light. Doctrines applicable to light as illumi-
nation are often inapplicable to light as an energy resource. See note 69 infra.
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of property rights3 2 The economic theory of property rights is thus an
important analytical tool for examining the problems of allocating re-
sources.
The creation of a property interest involves three elements: a defi-
nition of the right that is unambiguous and compatible with the nature
of the resource, an initial assignment of the right, and a method of
enforcing the right.33 Both the existing right and the proposed solar
right must be analyzed in relation to these elements.
The primary weakness of the current legal conception of sunlight
is the fact that it views sunlight as a natural right rather than as an
energy resource or an economic commodity.3 4 This basic conception
results in a definition of the right to light that impedes the use of solar
energy. Currently, the right to light is essentially a negative interest
because, while there is no right to receive direct insolation, a land-
owner does have the right to obstruct a neighbor's sunlight. The right
32 There is a systematic, but by no means uniform or static, relationship
between the capacity [to participate in economic decisionmaking] con-
ferred by property rights and economic decisions. This systematic in-
teraction provides a basis for a market. Thus market activities evolve
from and function within the institution of property rights. In turn,
property rights directly affect economic outcome, i.e., the pattern of
resource use, the quantity and mix of goods and services produced, and
the associated distribution of income and wealth.
Ditwiler, Water Problems and Property Rights-An Economic Perspective, 15
NAT. RESOURCES J. 663, 666 (1975). See also R. PosNER, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS
OF LAw (1972) ; Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960) ;
Demsetz, Some Aspects of Property Rights, 9 J.L. & EcoN. 61 (1966) ; Stigler,
The Law and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea for Scholars, 1 J. LEGAL STUD.
1 (1972).
3 See note 32 supra. See also Deavney, Eckert, Meyers, O'Hara, & Scott, A
Property System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A
Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1499, 1501-12 (1969) (sim-
ilar analysis of another portion of the electromagnetic spectrum, radio waves).
34 "The right to breath the air, and to enjoy the sunshine, is a natural one
." Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 383, 37 N.W. 838, 842 (1888). The pro-
posed right, as is the case with most property interests, is defined in terms of its
uses. Thus the right is circumscribed by the use of sunlight as an energy resource.
A close analogy is offered by water rights law. As with sunlight, the corpus of
water flowing in a natural stream is the property of no one; it is common or
public:
[Ulpon severance from the stream flow it generally becomes private
property. That is, water lawfully diverted from its natural course and
reduced to possession by means of artificial devices and put to a bene-
ficial use becomes the property [of the diverter]. This right granted
under the law is called a usufructuary right. . . . This usufructuary
right is regarded and protected as property.
Ditwiler, supra note 32, at 668. Similarly, it is the collection of sunlight by arti-
ficial means and its use as an energy resource that defines the solar right; the
installation of a solar energy system powered by the sun is the criterion that is
the measure of the proposed right.
[Volume 57, 1977]
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is thus a concomitant of the ability to develop land with little or no
regard for the effect of the development on adjoining landowners. This
obscures the economic value of sunlight. The proposed solar right,




More importantly, however, the current assignment of the right is
not conducive to the use of solar energy. While economic theory sug-
gests that the initial assignment of a property interest will have no effect
on resource allocation if the right is freely transferable, the theory as-
sumes that transfer transactions are costless.30 In fact, transaction costs
are often substantial. 37 For example, A and B are adjoining landown-
ers. If A decides to install a solar energy system, A will necessarily in-
clude the price of purchasing B's right to obstruct the required direct
insolation as part of the cost of the system. In a costless transaction
the right would be transferred to the most efficient use because, pre-
sumably, the party with the most valuable use would pay the other
party for the right. If A and B are individuals, the transaction costs
(the costs of negotiation, information gathering, memorialization, and
enforcement of the agreement) might well be minimal. Even in this
situation, however, the initial assignment of the right is likely to affect
the resource allocation if the transaction costs plus the transfer costs
exceed the difference in the values of the competing uses. In other
words, assume that the value to A of the sunlight as an energy resource
is $100 and the value to B of the right to build in a manner that will
obstruct the sunlight (rather than a manner which will not obstruct
the light) is $90. If the transaction costs exceed $10, it is unlikely that
35 Under the present system of property rights, the shadowing of a solar col-
lector by a building on adjacent land is an externality-a beneficial or harmful
effect on another person or group that results from the actions of a party if the
party did not consider the effect in the cost calculations of the action. See P. SAM-
UELSON, EcoNoMICS 476 (10th ed. 1976). The proposed right would require the
internalization of this external cost by requiring that the builder purchase the
right from the user of the solar energy system.
36 "With costless market transactions, the decisions of courts concerning lia-
bility for damage would be without effect on the allocation of resources." Coase,
supra note 32, at 10. But cf. Mishan, The Economics of Disamenity, 14 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 55, 67 (1974) ("Once we take cognizance of negotiating, adminis-
trative and other costs that are unavoidably incurred in effecting economic
changes ... the position of the law with respect to spillover effects [such as
the shadowing of a solar collector] becomes of critical importance."). See also
Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHILOSOPHY & PUB.
ArF. 3 (1975).
37 See generally Crocker, Externalities, Property Rights, and Transaction
Costs, 14 J.L. & EcoN. 451 (1971) ; Randall, Property Rights and Social Micro-
economics, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 729 (1975) ; Samuels, The Coase Theorem and
the Study of Law and Economics, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1974).
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A will purchase the right because the total costs would exceed the
value of the light to A despite the fact that the use of the sunlight as an
energy resource is theoretically more efficient. If A is a group of indi-
viduals, the transaction costs mount rapidly because there must be nego-
tiation not only between A and B but also among the members of group
A. Thus the initial assignment of the right can affect the efficiency of
the allocation of the resource.
3 s
The initial assignment of a right also affects the allocation of a re-
source due to the assignment's effect on the relative wealth of the par-
ties.89 A person assigned a property interest is made wealthier by the
assignment. 40 To take an extreme example, if there are two people
dying of thirst in a desert and one is given a canteen of water, it is un-
likely that the person with the water will sell it regardless of the price
offered by the other person. The result is that the assignment deter-
mines who uses the water. This inherent bias in favor of existing rights
is also observable in rights to light: the party assigned the right is made
wealthier by the assignment, and thus is better able to refuse the offers
of the person seeking to purchase the right.
Due to the fact that the initial assignment of a property right affects
the allocation of the natural resource, society is faced with a policy
choice. If solar energy use is to be encouraged rather than retarded by
the property rights structure, a right to receive direct insolation should
be created.
41
8 "Efficiency" in economic terminology "means exploiting economic resources
in such a way that human satisfaction as measured by aggregate willingness to
pay for goods and services is maximized." R. POSNER, supra note 32, at 4. Two
problems need to be noted, First, efficiency is a function of the existing property
rights system: "the establishment of any efficient situation or solution requires an
antecedent specification of the rights (protected interests) in terms of which
efficiency is determined." Samuels, supra note 37, at 6. Second, "rational individual
bargaining may not always lead to socially optimal outcomes." Regan, The Prob-
lem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & EcoN. 427, 430 (1972). This result is
especially likely in relation to energy resources because historically economists
have not treated natural resources as capital goods. In addition, there is no com-
ponent in energy prices for the value of the resource in situ for future generations:
the optimal social result may require a maximum conservation of energy resources
for the future, while economic decisionmakers are concerned with less lengthy
time periods. See generally Georgescu-Roegen, Energy and Economic Myths, 41
S.J. EcoN. 347 (1975). Thus strict economic efficiency may not be the proper goal.
39 See generally Baker, supra note 36.
40 Even Posner admits that "willingness to pay is . . . a function of the exist-
ing distribution of income and wealth in a society." R. POSNER, supra note 32, at
4. See also Samuels, supra note 37, at 6. In addition to the obvious increase in the
wealth of one party when a right is transferred, the ongoing exclusive right to
exploit a resource increases the wealth of the individual with the property inter-
est in the resource. This allows the individual to refuse a higher bribe from an
individual without the right.
41 While the legal recognition of property rights traditionally has lagged be-
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In itself, however, the creation of a solar right is insufficient; it is also
necessary to provide a method for protecting and enforcing the right
which is both effective and inexpensive. If the enforcement costs are too
high, the allocation of the resource may not be efficient because it is not
economically advantageous to defend the resource.42 Enforcement costs
are likely to be high when the right is defined ambiguously or when it
is burdened by countervailing presumptions or procedural requirements.
While economic theory does not present unambiguous rules for cre-
ating an effective system of property rights, it does delineate the im-
portant elements of such a system: the definition, assignment, and en-
forcement of the right. It is against this standard that any proposed
right must be measured.
Economic theory also does not provide a basis for making the central
policy decision. It is limited to specifying the results of the decision.
That is, economic theory can determine the probable results of the
assignment of a right, but it cannot determine which assignment is best.
This question must be resolved in terms of the goals of society.
II
POLICY FACTORS
Congress has declared it to be national policy to "pursue a vigorous
and viable program" to develop "solar energy as a major source of en-
ergy for our national needs." 43 Implementation of this policy will require
the removal of the current impediments to the use of solar energy, in-
cluding the lack of a solar right.
The creation of a solar right will necessitate a realignment of the
present system of property rights. The greatest tension created by this
realignment will develop because of the current policy favoring land
development. Presently the owner of surface land "owns at least as
hind social and technical developments, the creation of such interests to promote
social goals is permissible. This dynamic nature of property rights has been most
apparent recently in the extension of due process guarantees to things previously
classed as gratuities or status, for example, welfare benefits, Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970), public school attendance, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975), and a professor's interest in continuing employment, Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593 (1972). The basic methodology of the Court is instructive. Rather
than attempting to force new relationships into conventional property forms, the
Court balanced the benefits flowing from a recognition of the interest against the
potential detriments. The Court's approach indicates at least implicity that prop-
erty rights are a means or arranging rights among persons to attain socially desir-
able goals.
42 See generally Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights,
7 J.L. & EcoN. 11 (1964).
43 Solar Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of 1974, 42
U.S.C. § 5551(b) (1) (Supp. V 1975).
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much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connec-
tion with the land. The fact that he does not occupy it in a physical
sense-by the erection of buildings and the like-is not material. '44
While ownership of this airspace logically does not imply the right to
develop it, the bias of the law in favor of development has fostered this
belief.
Two policy arguments traditionally are advanced in support of land
development. The first equates land development with progress and
economic expansion and considers development to be desirable in it-
self.45 The second relies upon the belief that a landowner should be
free to develop land as an important example of this country's gen-
eral economic freedoms.
46
While the argument that development is intrinsically good may have
had validity on the expanding frontier of the nineteenth century, it is
now a questionable assumption. The increased awareness of the envi-
ronmental and social impact of development is only the most obvious
product of a changing perception; bigger is no longer automatically
assumed to be better.
47
44 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946). Causby sharply limited
the force of the common-law maxim, cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et
ad inferos. See note 30 supra. While allowing relief on the facts, the Supreme
Court held that the "doctrine has no place in the modern world." 328 U.S. at 261.
Although it is apparent in principle that "[tihe upper limits of the atmosphere
are clearly in the public domain, and the owner's title, if any, is limited by the
right of public passage," Neal, Airspace-Air Easements, in 1975 INSTITUTE ON
PLANNING, ZONING, & EMINENT DOMAIN 309, 313, the dividing line between
public and private ownership has never been specified with greater clarity. See
generally Ball, supra note 30; Note, Conveyance and Taxation of Air Rights, 64
COLUm. L. REv. 338 (1964). The analysis in Causby, however, demonstrates that
property entitlements associated with land are flexible and will be modified when
changed circumstances require their alteration. Similar modifications to encour-
age the use of solar energy should be equally permissible.
4 5 See generally Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 App. Div. 37, 258
N.Y.S. 229 (1932) ; Sanderson v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 86 Pa. 401 (1878).
46 "Many vacant lots in our cities and towns are owned by persons who reside
at a distance, and who are either unable or unwilling to improve them. It would
be inconvenient to compel them to do so, on the penalty of forfeiting a valuable
right by neglect." Hoy v. Sterrett, 2 Watts 327, 331 (Pa. 1834). See also cases
cited in note 63 infra.
4T "Another hopeful sign . . . is the change in the values of the public over the
last decade. Traditional economic indices are no longer viewed as the sole meas-
ures of progress. We are entering an era in which qualitative values and aesthetic
factors are considered as important as material wealth." Jackson, Foreword:
Environmental Quality, the Courts, and the Congress, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 1073,
1074 (1970). This change in values can be seen in such diverse areas as the pas-
sage of no-growth ordinances, see, e.g., Deutsch, Land Use Growth Controls: A
Case Study of San Jose and Livermore, California, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 1
(1974), the increased use of open-space zoning, see, e.g., Note, What A Beautiful
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The second argument assumes that a landowner has an absolute
right to develop the land. This ignores the fact that even fee simple
owners do not have such a right. 48 For centuries the common law has
recognized the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas: "Use your
own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another. '49 The
common law nuisance action is one example of this principle. Zoning
and other land use restrictions are other examples of permissible re-
straints on the ability of a landowner to develop property.
The potential difficulties in balancing these competing policy factors
may appear greater than they in fact are. While the creation of a prop-
erty interest in sunlight necessarily will restrict some uses of super-
jacent airspace, 50 the fear that the recognition of a right to light will
halt all development is groundless; most uses of land will remain un-
affected. In addition, in exchange for an already limited development
potential, the landowner will receive a guaranteed source of energy.
The policies of promoting the use of solar energy and of allowing
land development thus are not incompatible. The tension between these
two goals, however, is symptomatic of a more fundamental decision that
faces this nation: the choice of an energy future. This choice is between
two alternatives :
One is an economic future dominated by the nuclear breeder
and/or nuclear fusion, with solar energy playing a secondary
though important role. The other is a future in which society
has rejected dependence on nuclear energy and has opted in-
stead for primary dependence on solar energy with a stabilized
level of energy use far less than presently projected. There
are no other options. 51
Wilderness . . . Let's Develop It, 35 U. PIr. L. REv. 179 (1973), and the rec-
ognition of aesthetics as a permissible criterion for land use decisions, see, e.g.,
Note, Aesthetic Nuisance: An Emerging Cause of Action, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1075
(1970).
48 "The thought is inherent that not even a fee-simple owner has a totality of
rights in and with respect to his real property. Insofar as the law of nuisance is
concerned, rights as to the usage of land are relative." Riblet v. Spokane-Portland
Cement Co., 41 Wash. 2d 249, 254, 248 P.2d 380, 382 (1952). See also Carter v.
Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451 (1923).
4 9 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1551 (4th ed. 1951).
50 The most obvious limitation on the development of land will be restrictions
on the height of buildings and vegetation. In Chicago, for example, at 9:00 a.m.
and 3:00 p.m. on December 22, land to the southeast and southwest, respectively,
of the collector must be free of all obstructions 18 feet above the height of the
collector for a distance of 100 feet from the collector; there must be no obstruc-
tions higher than 90 feet above the collector for a distance of 500 feet from the
collector. At noon, the airspace must be unobstructed 42 feet above the collector
to a distance 100 feet south of the collector; the airspace must be unobstructed
over a height of 210 feet within 500 feet of the collector. Robbins, supra note 15, at
373.
51 STANFORD STUDY, supra note 2, at 99; see Lovins, Energy Strategy: The
Road Not Taken?, FOREIGN AFF., Oct. 1976, at 65.
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Thus, because solar energy will play an important role in this country's
energy future under either option, it is important that a method of en-
suring solar access be developed.
III
PRESENT LEGAL DOCTRINES
A. Common-Law Easements of Lights
To guarantee solar access a landowner must, for example, be able
to prevent the construction of buildings or limit the height of vegetation
that will shadow the collector. The common law classifies such a power
as a negative easement.52 Historically negative easements of light and
air have been recognized, independently of an express grant, in four
factual situations. Three of these, frequently grouped under the title
"ancient lights,"5 3 evolved in England prior to the American Revolu-
tion. The fourth, the easement of a property owner over an adjacent
public street, is a more recent creation.
1. Ancient Lights
While the origin of the doctrine remains unclear, cases from the me-
dieval period indicate that the common law originally conceived access
to light to be a natural right, incident to the ownership of land. 54 This
approach was subsequently rejected. The property interest that was
eventually recognized was that of a negative easement, the right to pre-
vent the obstruction of light. By the end of the sixteenth century, it
had been determined that a proprietor of land with a structure con-
taining old windows had the power to prevent adjoining landowners
52 A negative easement is defined as the aggregate of rights whereby the owner
of the dominant estate may prevent the owner of the servient estate from doing
otherwise permissible acts upon the servient estate. Easements of light, air, view,
and subjacent lateral support are the most common examples. Negative easements
are contrasted with positive easements, which allow the dominant owner to en-
gage in otherwise impermissible acts upon the servient estate, for example, ease-
ments of way. See generally RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 452 (1944) ; Cook,
Legal Analysis in the Law of Prescriptive Easements, 15 S. CAL. L. REV. 44, 47
(1941).
53 While the term "ancient lights" properly refers to "[w]indows or openings
which have remained in the same place and condition twenty years or more,"
BouvIER's LAw DICTIONARY 71 (student ed. 1928), in this Comment it will be
used in its more general sense to denominate the legal doctrines recognizing pre-
scriptive and implied easements of light.
54 "If a man builds a house which stops the light coming to my house . . . I
shall have the Assize" ["mes si ho[m]e leve un meason q[ue] estopp[e] le light de
ma mea[son] . . . jeo aura en[ver]s luy Assize]. Y.B. Mich. 22 Hen. 6, f. 14, pl. 23
(1444). See also Y.B. Mich. 11 Hen. 4, f. 25b, pl. 48 (1410) ; Y.B. Mich. 7 Mdw. 3,
f. 50b, pl. 25 (1333) ; Y.B. Trin. 19 Edw. 2, p. 679 (1325).
[Volume 57, 19771
Comments
from obstructing the accustomed amount of light. 55 This right could
be enforced in a nuisance action either for money damages"6 or for an
injunction to prevent the construction of the offending building. 7 At
the time of the American Revolution, negative easements of light and
air had been recognized in three instances: they could arise through
prescription5 s or through implication in both sales 59 and leases 6° of real
property.
(a) Prescriptive Easements of Light
The English judiciary created a right to light based on a prescriptive
claim, an assertion of a right or title that arose from uninterrupted and
immemorial enjoyment. While the initial decision in this country uni-
formly followed the common-law rule,6 judicial opinion shifted follow-
55 In Bowry and Pope's case, 1 Leo. 168, 74 Eng. Rep. 155 (K.B. 1589), the
court, while holding the doctrine inapplicable on the facts, noted that "if it were
an antient [sic] window time out of memory, etc., there the light or benefit of it
ought not to be impaired by any act whatsoever; and such was the opinion of
the whole Court." See also Bland v. Mosely, Q.B. Roll Trin. 29 Eliz. m. 253
(1587), reprinted in A. KIRALFY, THE AcTIoN ON THE CASE 213-14 (1951) ; 7
W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 339-42 (3d ed. 1926).
56 E.g., Johnson v. Long, I Ld. Raym. 370, 91 Eng. Rep. 1144 (K.B. 1699)
(the court noted that while the plaintiff could not maintain a second action for the
erection of the same wall, he could bring an action and recover damages for the
continuance of the nuisance).
57 E.g., Ryder v. Bentham, 1 Ves. Sen. 543, 27 Eng. Rep. 1194 (Ch. 1750) (the
court ordered the defendant "to pull down the scaffold, or poles and boards already
raised, and be injoined from building or erecting, whereby the plaintiff's lights
may be obstructed" until a court of law could determine the rights of the parties).
5SE.g.,Lewis v. Price, 2 Wms. Saund. 175 n.2, 85 Eng. Rep. 924 n.2 (K.B.
1761); William Aldred's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 57b, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1610) ;
Hughes v. Keeme, Calth. 1, 80 Eng. Rep. 649 (K.B. 1610). The doctrine had been
modified by the Chancery, in Fishmonger's Co. v. East India Co., Dick. 163, 21
Eng. Rep. 232 (Ch. 1752), to require a material deprivation of light for the action
to lie: "[I]t is not sufficient to say that it will alter the plaintiff's lights, for then
no vacant piece of ground could be built on in the city." Id.
59 E.g., Palmer v. Fletcher, 1 Lev. 123, 83 Eng. Rep. 329 (K.B. 1663) ; Cox v.
Mathews, 1 Vent. 238, 86 Eng. Rep. 159 (K.B. 1663).
60 A landlord could not obstruct the light of the lessee through actions on land
retained by the landlord. E.g., Rosewell v. Pryor, 6 Mod. 116, 87 Eng. Rep. 874
(K.B. 1709). This branch of the doctrine will not be examined. A slight majority
of American jurisdictions, however, recognize the right of the lessee to a continu-
ance of the preexisting light during the term of the lease. E.g., Darnell v.
Columbia Show-Case Co., 129 Ga. 62, 58 S.E. 631 (1907); Rainbow Shop
Patchogue Corp. v. Roosevelt Nassau Operating Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 896, 304
N.Y.S.2d 92 (1969). Contra, Owsley v. Hammer, 36 Cal. 2d 710, 227 P.2d 263
(1951). See also 23 CAL. L. REV. 440 (1935).
61 E.g., Clawson v. Primrose, 4 Del. Ch. 643 (1873) ; Gerber v. Grabel, 16 Ill.
217 (1854) ; Manier v. Myers, 43 Ky. (4 Mon.) 514 (1844) (dictum) ; Robeson
v. Pittenger, 2 N.J. Eq. 57 (1838) ; McCready v. Thomson, 23 S.C.L. (Dud.) 131
(1837) ; Berkeley v. Smith, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 892 (1876).
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ing the decision of Parker v. Foote.6 2
Three primary reasons were advanced for the rejection of the doc-
trine: first, courts thought the doctrine would be an impediment to eco-
nomic expansion ;63 second, a largely unarticulated feeling existed that
light somehow differed, factually and conceptually, from other forms
of property;64 and third, the belief was expressed that the doctrine
62 19 Wend. 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838). The holding for which this case is most
frequently cited, that the doctrine of ancient lights is unsuited to the economic
conditions of this country, is actually dictum. The court in fact remanded the case
for a new trial on the grounds that the long enjoyment of the light gave rise only
to a presumption that a grant had been made. This was a factual question for the
jury, not a legal question for the judge, and had to be submitted to the jury if the
defendant presented evidence to counter the presumption. This miscitation is only
one of many examples in ancient light cases. See generally Comment, Implied
Easements of Light and Air, 4 YALE L.J. 190 (1895).
63 "A line of decisions under [the doctrine] would palsy enterprise, cripple in-
dustry, and check advancement; and the effect would be to dampen the spirits and
shackle the energies of a free people." Keiper v. Klein, 51 Ind. 316, 323 (1875).
See also Tinker v. Forbes, 136 Ill. 221, 26 N.E. 503 (1891) ; Rogers v. Sawin, 76
Mass. (10 Gray) 376 (1875). This argument reflects the prevalent prodevelop-
ment bias of courts during this period and was the primary practical reason for
the rejection of the doctrine. While reflecting the prodevelopment stance of courts,
the effect of this argument actually favors dormant, speculative ownership be-
cause the doctrine is not applicable unless the potentially servient estate has re-
mained undeveloped for a substantial period due to the length of time required
for a prescriptive claim to develop. In addition, the persuasiveness of the argu-
ment is undercut substantially by the economic development in England and the
Commonwealth countries which have continued to recognize prescriptive ease-
ments of light.
The decisions which rely on this rationale also frequently reveal a class bias
inherent in the prodevelopment position:
The consequence of the admission of the right [to acquire easements
of light by prescription] would be, that the occupants of low and inferior
houses, such as are usually the first erected in new towns, at the end of
a few years, would acquire rights without any act of adverse posses-
sion, which might render useless and waste the most valuable lots for
business purposes or residences in our growing towns and cities.
Klein v. Gehrung, 25 Tex. (Supp.) 232, 243 (1860).
64 Perhaps the most articulate statement of this argument is found in Stein
v. Hauck, 56 Ind. 65 (1877) :
[A]n easement in light or air is unlike any other easement known to
the law. It is neither an appurtenance nor a hereditament. . . . No
exclusive right can be had in light or air; legislation cannot create
such a right, because man has no exclusive dominion over them. They
are for all in common . . . . To give a right of property in light or
air, which can control the right to the use of land, is to make the inci-
dent greater than the principal, and allow the shadow to control the
substance.
Id. at 69. Stripped of the rhetoric of the period, the argument was that the con-
struction of a building with windows overlooking adjacent land was only the
exercise of a legal right. Since the builder did not impinge upon any right of the
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worked an injustice because such easements were not "open and ap-
parent."'6 5 Frequently courts presented a jumble of these arguments
adjoining landowner, the adjoining landowner did not have a cause of action, and
thus the builder was not adverse to the rights of the adjoining landowner. Lacking
the element of adversity, which courts were beginning to require, no prescriptive
right could arise. See, e.g., Ray v. Sweeney, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 1 (1878) ; King v.
Miller, 8 N.J. Eq. 559 (1851) ; Austin v. Bloch, 165 Or. 116, 105 P.2d 868 (1940).
This argument embodies a confusion between elements of adverse possession (ap-
plicable to claims of a fee interest) and those of the lost grant theory (applicable to
the acquisition of easements). The common-law ability to acquire a prescriptive
easement arose from the common-sense idea that long-continued use gave rise
to the presumption that the use was rightful, i.e., stemmed from a grant of the
right. Adverse possession, on the other hand, required hostility to the interests
of the rightful owner because the adverse claimant would obtain title to the land.
Despite the obvious dissimilarity of both the tests and the underlying policies,
courts frequently mixed elements of both tests. Thus the court in Parker v. Foote
argued that to "authorize the presumption [of a grant] the enjoyment must not
only be uninterrupted for the period of 20 years, but it must be adverse, not by
leave or favor." 19 Wend. at 313. See generally Simonton, Fictional Lost Grant in
Prescription-A Nocuous Archaism, 35 W. VA. L.Q. 46 (1928).
65 Running through the cases is the often-expressed fear that the owner of
undeveloped land
may "stand by" while the invading claim, which is finally to embarrass,
if not to destroy, the usefulness of his land, is gradually accruing
against him, until it becomes a vested right, which he cannot dispute.
.. .No one should stand in danger of unwittingly suffering burdens
to be laid upon his property, nor be constantly compelled to guard
against such an insidious invasion of his rights.
Stein v. Hauck, 56 Ind. 65, 69-70 (1877). This fear has been incorporated into
the modern American tests for prescription. To be sufficient to support a claim
of prescription, the use must be open, apparent, continuous, notorious, adverse,
uninterrupted, and under a claim of right. See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY §§ 8.53-58 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) ; 5 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§
457-60 (1944) ; Cook, supra note 52. Such requirements reflect the general judi-
cial hostility to the transfer of property rights by prescription. Because the pur-
pose served by these requirements is merely to ensure that the use be sufficiently
apparent so that the potentially servient owner have constructive notice, actual
notice, such as would be present from the installation of a solar collector, should
be sufficient.
In addition, a few courts that were predisposed against the doctrine reasoned
that no American lights were ancient because they had not existed since 1189.
Compare Hayden v. Dutcher, 31 N.J. Eq. 217 (1879), Lynch v. Hill, 24 Del. Ch.
86, 6 A2d 614 (1939) and Comment, Ancient Lights, 10 ALB. L.J. 65 (1874) with
Clawson v. Primrose, 4 Del. Ch. 643 (1873) and Comment, Ancient Lights, 9 ALB.
L.J. 403 (1874). See also Annot., 46 Am. Dec. 578 (1886).
A few states enacted statutes expressly abolishing the doctrine. E.g., GA. CODE
ANN. § 85-1201 (1970) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 187, § 1 (Michie/Law. Co-op.
1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-7-3 (1970); W. VA. CODE § 2-1-2 (1971). Even
statutes that provided "the right of way, air, light or other easement, from, in,
upon, or over, the land of another, shall not be acquired by adverse use, unless
such use shall have continued for twenty years" were not immune from a con-
struction which abolished the rule. Stein v. Hauck, 56 Ind. 65, 70-71 (1877)
Pierre v. Fernald, 26 Me. 436, 442 (1847).
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that reveals a lack of analytical thought: once opinion had clearly shifted
against the rule, courts rushed to join the emerging majority. 66 At pres-
ent no American common-law jurisdiction67 affirmatively recognizes an
ability to acquire an easement of light by prescription.
68
These arguments, which seemed persuasive to nineteenth century
courts, appear much less so now. The rejection of the doctrine was
based upon the use of sunlight as a source of illumination rather than as
an energy resource"9 and upon the economic conditions prevalent in the
nineteenth century. Therefore, a reexamination of the question in light
of the current social and economic environment, the need for new energy
sources, and the advantages of solar energy, rather than a misplaced
reliance on precedents from another era, is appropriate.70
60See, e.g., Ward v. Neal, 35 Ala. 602 (1860), on rehearing 37 Ala. 500
(1861) ; Lapere v. Luckey, 23 Kan. *534 (1880).
67 Louisiana, a civil-law jurisdiction, still recognizes a servitude of light that
may be acquired prescriptively. See Goodwin v. Alexander, 105 La. 658, 30 So.
102 (1901) ; LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 674, 711, 715, 717, 782 (West 1952) ; Com-
ment, Adjoining Landowners: Right to Light and Air, 34 TUL. L. Rzv. 599 (1960).
The point remains theoretically open in a number of other states.
68 A case that illustrates the failure of courts to reexamine the possible appli-
cation of the doctrine is Fountainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five,
Inc., 114 So. 2d 367 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). The Eden Roc, a luxury hotel
on Miami Beach, sought to enjoin an adjoining hotel from constructing an addi-
tion that would cast a shadow over the Eden Roc's swimming pool. In dismiss-
ing the temporary injunction granted by the circuit court, the appellate court
noted only:
There being . . . no legal right to the free flow of light and air from
the adjoining land, it is universally held that where a structure serves
a useful and beneficial purpose, it does not give rise to a cause of
action . . . even though it causes injury to another by cutting off the
light and air ....
Id. at 359.
69 A major limitation on the utility of all current legal theories as methods of
ensuring access to insolation is the fact that the law has been concerned with
sunlight only as a source of illumination. Until recently concern with the use of
sunlight as an energy resource has not been articulated. Doctrines applicable to
illumination will require extensive modification if they are to be extended to
provide for the use of sunlight as a source of energy. Rights to light as illumina-
tion may, however, be indistinguishable in fact from solar easements. While
solar energy is transmitted on a broader band of the electromagnetic spectrum
than visible light (because usable energy is contained in both the infrared and
ultraviolet regions), the fact that there is no method of obstructing invisible
solar radiation without also obstructing some visible light has led two propo-
nents of solar energy to argue that a right to light as illumination "includes or
implies" a solar easement. Eisenstadt & Utton, supra note 15, at 374. Because
illumination does not reguire direct insolation, however, it is questionable whether
the courts, with their apparent hostility to a right to light, will agree with this con-
clusion.
70 England has continued to follow the doctrine and therefore offers some evi-
dence of the possible effects of a readoption of it in this country. The modern
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Even if courts reexamine their rejection of the doctrine, ancient
lights is less than an ideal method of ensuring access to solar energy.
Its adaptability to present conditions is limited by presumptions created
for resolving problems that arise when sunlight is viewed only as a
source of illumination. The substantial time generally required for pre-
scription,7 for example, is not suited to the use of sunlight as an energy
resource. Thus, although the doctrine offers the most obvious common-
law model, its potential utility is limited.
(b) Implied Easements of Light
Despite their theoretical differences, the doctrines of implied7 2 and
English formulation of the doctrine was enunciated in the decision of the House
of Lords in Colls v. Home & Colonial Stores, Ltd., [19041 A.C. 179. After noting
that the logical application of a rule allowing no deprivation of light "would ren-
der it almost impossible for towns to grow, and would formidably restrict the
rights of people to utilise their own land," id. at 182, the Lord Chancellor formu-
lated the proper test as whether the defendant has "so materially interfered with
the light previously enjoyed by the plaintiffs as to amount to a nuisance." Id. at 185.
The difficulty inherent in determining what constitutes a material interference
and the development of the "grumble line" test ("the point whereat ordinary
common sense people would begin to grumble at the quantum of light," Charles
Semon & Co. v. Bradford Corp., [1922] 2 Ch. 737, 747-48) are examined in
Fishenden v. Higgs & Hill Ltd., [1935] 153 L.T.R. (n.s.) 128 (C.A.) and Ough
v. King, [1927] 3 All E.R. 859 (C.A.). See also R. ComBE, A TaEATISE UPON THE
LAW OF LIGHT (1911) ; Wilkinson, Let There Be More Light, 118 NEW L.J. 7
(1968).
The effects of heavy bombing of English cities during World War Il led to
the reformulation of the doctrine with the passage of the Rights of Light Act,
1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 56 (1959). The Act allows a potentially servient owner
to interrupt the running of the prescriptive period by filing a notice. Id. § 2. See
also Note, Access to Light: Obstruction by Notice, 230 LAW TIMES 77 (1960).
The intention of the Act was to encourage more intensive development of land
by discouraging the vesting of rights to light. See COMMITTEE ON THE LAW RE-
LATING TO RIGHTS TO LIGHT, REPORT 8, 11 (Cmnd. 473 1958). Although over
two hundred cases were filed during the early years under section 2 of the Act,
the actual effect appears to have been less than expected. See Greene, Rights of
Light, 109 SOLICITORS' J. 768, 769 (1965) ; Greene, Rights of Light, 112 LAW J.
467, 468 (1962). A recent Law Reform Committee report on prescription argued
that the obstruction-by-notice provision employed in section two are too "cum-
bersome." Wilkinson, Law Reform Committee: Fourteenth Report on the Ac-
quisition of Easements and Profits by Prescription, 30 MoD. L. REV. 189, 191
n.22 (1967).
The doctrine apparently remains in effect in Canada. See, e.g., Feigenbaum v.
Jackson, [1901] 8 B.C. 417; 10 CANADIAN ENCLYCLOPEDiC DIGEST, Easements § 5
(2d Western ed. 1960).
71 Oregon, for example, has a ten-year statute of limitations for adverse pos-
session. ORS 12.050 (1975). The courts have adopted the same period for the
prescriptive acquisition of an easement. E.g., Feldman v. Knapp, 196 Or. 453, 250
P.2d 92 (1952).
72 The creation of an easement by implication rests upon the implied intent
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prescriptive easements of light frequently have been treated as being
synonymous. 78 Thus, following the initial period when courts were
willing to imply an easement of light into the conveyance of a house
with windows overlooking land retained by the grantor, 74 most juris-
dictions rejected the common-law doctrine.
7 5
A number of jurisdictions, however, recognized an exception to the
majority rule in the event of necessity. The degree of necessity required
varies substantially,76 though the best position requires "reasonable
necessity."
Unfortunately, the utility of this doctrine is limited in its potential
application to solar collectors by the requirement that the use of the
sunlight, if it is to be implied into the conveyance, must have existed
when the land was transferred by the grantor. While an action could be
brought to insure light to existing windows, this would not provide a
solar right. Such an approach also might encounter little sympathy in
the courts.
of the parties, inferred "from the circumstances under which the conveyance was
made rather than from the language of the conveyance." RESTATEMENT OF PROP-
ERTY § 476, Comment a (1944). The grantor is presumed to include in the grant
everything reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the property conveyed.
For example, if A, the owner of two parcels of land only one of which has access
to a highway, conveys the landlocked parcel to B, an easement of way will be
implied into the grant. See generally RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 474-76 (1944)
2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 8.31-.43 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
73 "[T] his doctrine of easements in light and air, founded upon sheer necessity
and convenience, like the kindred doctrine of 'ancient windows,' or prescriptive
right to light and air by long user . . . are [both] based upon similar reasons and
considerations, and both should stand or fall together." Mullen v. Stricker, 19
Ohio St. 135, 143-44 (1869). For an example of the more common, unprincipled
mingling of the theories, see McDonald v. Bromley, 24 Leg. Inst. 157, 6 Phila.
Rep. 302 (C.P. Philadelphia, Pa. 1867). See also 23 ILL. L. REV. 399 (1928).
74 E.g., United States v. Appleton, 24 F. Cas. 841 (C.C.D. Mass. 1833) (No.
14, 463) (Story, J.) ; Janes v. Jenkins, 34 Md. 1 (1871) ; Story v. Odin, 12 Mass.
157 (1815) ; Sutphen v. Therkelson, 38 N.J. Eq. 318 (1884).
7 5 E.g., Kennedy v. Burnap, 120 Cal. 488, 52 P. 843 (1898) ; Baird v. Hanna,
328 Ill. 436, 159 N.E. 793 (1928); Boyd v. McDonald, 81 Nev. 642, 408 P.2d
717 (1965).
70 The degree of necessity has been variously defined. Courts have specified
standards ranging from "necessary for the reasonable enjoyment," e.g., Puorto v.
Chieppa, 78 Conn. 401, 62 A. 664 (1905) (dictum) ; Greer v. Van Meter, 54 N.J.
Eq. 270, 33 A. 794 (1896) ; to "absolute and actual necessity," e.g., Hampe v. Elia,
251 Mass. 465, 146 N.E. 730 (1925) ; Maioriello v. Arlotta, 364 Pa. 557, 73 A.2d
374 (1950). Some jurisdictions also require that an alternative lighting source
not be readily or economically available. E.g., Nomar v. Ballard, 134 W. Va. 492,
60 S.E.2d 710 (1950). Georgia has statutorily provided for an implied easement
of light when it is "necessary for the reasonable enjoyment." GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 85-1201 (1970). See also 23 ILL. L. REV. 399 (1928). New Jersey is the only
jurisdiction with a significant amount of litigation on the question. See Kanis,
Implied Easements of Light and Air, 63 N.J.L.J. 142 (1940).
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At a minimum, however, in those jurisdictions which recognize the
necessity exception, a grantor who constructs and sells a solar home,
and the subsequent grantees of adjacent parcels,77 could be prevented
from obstructing the sunlight. The minority rule, therefore, should be
of increasing efficacy as the number of solar developments increase.
Those jurisdictions which have rejected the doctrine should reconsider
the validity of their precedents in light of the changed circumstances.
2. An Abutting Landowner's Easement in a Public Street
A landowner whose property abuts a public street or highway has a
"right to receive light from the space occupied by the street.' '78 This
right can be enforced, independent of the ownership of the fee of the
roadway, either by an injunction to halt the construction or to remove
the obstruction, or by a suit for damages.
79
The value of this class of easements of light lies in the fact that the
courts clearly have recognized a property interest in light, rather than
in its actual utility as a method of insuring solar access. Because most
buildings are not located on the north sides of streets where they would
receive sunlight from the street, and because the doctrine does not pre-
vent the obstruction of light by construction on the other side of a street,
the theory in itself is insufficient. The doctrine does have significant
precedential value, however, because the recognition of a property in-
terest in light counters one of the primary justifications advanced for
rejecting the doctrine of ancient lights.80
77 Subsequent grantees are barred on the grounds that the grantor is incapable
of conveying a greater interest than the grantor owns. Since the grantor does not
own the right to obstruct the lights, the power to do so cannot be conveyed to
a grantee.
78 Williams v. Los Angeles Ry., 150 Cal. 594, 595, 89 P. 330, 331 (1907). See
also Story v. New York El. Ry., 90 N.Y. 122 (1882); Townsend, Grace & Co.
v. Epstein, 93 Md. 537, 49 A. 629 (1901). Contra, Probasco v. City of Reno, 85
Nev. 563, 459 P.2d 772 (1969).
79 The abutting owner's easement is subordinate to the public's use of the
road as a road. E.g., Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818
(1943); Willamette Iron Works v. Oregon Ry. & Navigation Co., 26 Or. 224,
37 P. 1016 (1894) ; Park Hotel v. Ketchum, 184 Wis. 182, 199 N.W. 219 (1924).
Thus, the abutter may enjoin a private party's interference with the easements.
E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Tyson, 133 Ala. 459, 32 So. 144 (1902) ; Northio Theatres
Corp. v. 226 Main St. Hotel Corp., 313 Ky. 329, 231 S.W.2d 65 (1950) ; Bischof
v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 75 Neb. 838, 106 N.W. 996 (1906). Not all govern-
mental interferences will be enjoined, however. The distinctions drawn between
governmental actions which constitute new servitudes on a street, and thus re-
quire compensation, and those which do not frequently are metaphysical. See
generally Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE L.J.
221 (1931).
80 See note 64 supra.
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B. Contractual Guarantees
Contractual agreements between adjoining landowners presently offer
the most certain method of insuring uninterrupted access to sunlight.
Such easements may be created through agreements directly between
the concerned parties or through the inclusion of suitable restrictions
contained in deeds that convey land within a certain area, frequently
a residential or commercial development.
It is universally conceded that a property interest in light may be
created by express grant,"' covenant,8 2 or reservation 3 in a deed or
other instrument.8 4 While a lawyer employed to draft the necessary
instrument may encounter unfamiliar complexities such as specification
of the relevant angles, height limitations, and apportionment of the costs
of keeping vegetation trimmed, the instrument can be modeled on forms
used for more traditional easements. The usual difficulties of ensuring
that the interest will run with the land are present and must be re-
solved.
8 5
In some instances, restrictions on the use of land that antedate the
utilization of solar energy may serve to guarantee solar access. Courts
81 Most jurisdictions have recognized the ability to create such interests either
by case or statutory law. See, e.g., Baird v. Hanna, 328 Ill. 436, 159 N.E. 793
(1927); Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N.W. 440 (1877) ; CAL.
CIV. CODE § 801(8) (West 1954).
82 A covenant is an agreement between two or more landowners which will
run with the land and bind subsequent owners if it fulfills certain common-law
requirements. While not an interest in land, a covenant is more than a contract.
See, e.g., Rosenkrans v. Snover, 19 N.J. Eq. 420 (1869); M.T. Garvin & Co.
v. Lancaster County, 290 Pa. 448, 139 A. 154 (1927). If the covenant does not
run at law, equity frequently will enforce it as an equitable servitude against
assignees of the land with notice of its provisions. See generally Reno, The En-
forcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land (pts. 1-2), 28 VA. L. REv. 951, 1067
(1942).
83 A reservation is a creation of a new interest in the grantor in the land con-
veyed to the grantee. See, e.g., Petersen v. Friedman, 162 Cal. App. 2d 245, 328
P.2d 264 (1958) ; Hasselbring v. Koepke, 263 Mich. 466, 248 N.W. 869 (1933).
84 The requirements of the Statute of Frauds must be met because an interest
in land is being conveyed. See, e.g., Miller v. Lawlor, 245 Iowa 1144, 66 N.W.2d
267 (1954).
85 Jurisdictions which strictly construe the requirement that the interest must
"touch and concern" land if it is to run, might hold the benefit to be too personal.
Although this conclusion seems unlikely, it would prevent the running of the
interest. See generally RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, §§ 454, 489-92, 537 (1944) ;
Simes, Assignability of Easements in Gross in American Law, 22 MicH. L. Rv.
521 (1924). A statute specifically recognizing the validity of such easements,
restrictions, and covenants could eliminate potential problems that surround the
question of ensuring that the agreement will run with the land. See, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-42b (West Supp. 1977) and MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184,
§§ 31-33 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1977) which provide for the recognition and en-
forcement of conservation and preservation easements.
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frequently have looked to the function, rather than the terminology, of
the right in question and have given effect to easements of light that
were not thus denominated. Instruments containing building line 6 and
height restrictions, 7 for example, have been construed to create such
easements.
Although these agreements offer the owner of a solar energy system
a high degree of certainty, their potential utility is limited. Primarily,
the necessity to purchase the easement adds to the cost of the sys-
tem.88 Additionally, because the easement is real property, there is
the possibility that it will be included in the assessment for property
tax purposes.8 9 Either result will have a substantial negative impact
on solar energy use, which is presently only approaching economic com-
petitiveness with traditional energy resources. Thus agreements be-
tween landowners are not an ideal solution to the problem of ensuring
access to solar energy.
Prospectively, the incorporation of restrictive covenants into deeds
conveying land within a large development offers a solution to the cost
problem. If the developer/grantor inserts similar restrictions9" into
deeds, or incorporates a general development plan into the conveyances
by reference, 91 courts normally will enforce the restrictions. Thus a
86 E.g., Muzzarelli v. Hulshizer, 163 Pa. 643, 30 A. 291 (1894) ; Settegast v.
Settegast Realty Co., 242 S.W. 485 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922). But cf. Snyder v.
Plankenhorn, 398 Pa. 540, 159 A.2d 209 (1960) (building line held to be for
status rather than light). Given courts' generally lukewarm support of rights to
light, it is questionable whether they will be willing to construe such restrictions
to provide solar access, especially because the original parties to the restrictions
are unlikely to have considered such uses when they drafted the agreement.
87 E.g., Coudert v. Sayer, 46 N.J. Eq. 386, 19 A. 190 (1890) ; McDonough v.
W.W. Snow Constr. Co., 131 Vt. 436, 306 A.2d 119 (1973).
88 Due to the necessity of keeping the solar horizon unobstructed over a large
area, the owner of a solar energy system would be required to purchase ease-
ments over noncontiguous lots. See note 50 supra.
89 See generally Macht v. Department of Assessments, 266 Md. 602, 296
A.2d 162 (1972) (tax assessment on an easement of light and air upheld) ; Com-
ment, Taxation of Easements in Airspace, 33 MD. L. Rnv. 159 (1973); Note,
note 44 supra.
90 The restrictions inserted or incorporated into the deeds do not have to be
identical. The controlling question is whether there is sufficient evidence of a
general developmental scheme. Compare Humphreys v. Ibach, 110 N.J. Eq. 647,
160 A. 531 (1932) (general scheme found although building setback lines varied)
and Snashall v. Jewell, 228 Or. 130, 363 P.2d 566 (1961) (general plan discerned
although height restrictions not present in all deeds) with Tidd v. Fifty Assocs.,
238 Mass. 421, 131 N.E. 77 (1921) (variation in setback lines indicative of lack
of general developmental plan).
91 E.g., Russell v. Palos Verde Properties, 218 Cal. App. 2d 754, 32 Cal. Rptr.
488 (1963) (reference in deeds to recorded instrument containing restrictions) ;
Sunset Hills Homeowners Ass'n v. Karel, 39 Ill. App. 2d 477, 189 N.E.2d 41
(1963) (restrictions contained on recorded plat) ; Blum v. Hodapp, 87 Ohio App.
45, 86 N.E.2d 807 (1949) (restrictions noted on recorded plat).
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developer constructing a group of solar buildings can guarantee uninter-
rupted sunlight to the potential purchasers by including such restric-
tions.
9 2
Unfortunately, while such areawide restrictions are an effective and
relatively simple solution, they are too cumbersome to be applied to
existing neighborhoods. The difficulty of obtaining the necessary degree
of unanimity will generally preclude the use of this method. Unless
existing restrictions can be construed to provide the necessary guaran-
tees, the costs and negotiation difficulties of contractual agreements are
likely to prevent widespread use in existing neighborhoods.
C. Legislation
1. The Response to the Energy Crisis
State legislatures have shown an increasing concern with energy-
related problems. Since the energy crisis of 1973, more than half of the
states have enacted energy legislation. A majority of these statutes,
however, merely established advisory and planning boards.9 3
A few states have moved beyond the planning stage and have sought
to encourage the development and use of alternative energy resources.
At least 25 states now have some form of tax incentives for solar
energy systems. 94 While varying in detail, the incentives fall into five
92 Generally the courts require evidence establishing an intent by the original
grantor to create a general plan of development for an ascertainable area that
imposes reasonably mutual burdens and benefits among the parcels conveyed. See
generally Clark, Equitable Servitudes, 16 MICH. L. REv. 90 (1917) ; Reno, note
82 supra; Williams, Restrictions on the Use of Land: Covenants Running with
the Land at Law, 27 TEX. L. REv. 419 (1949).
98 See, e.g., CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 25000-25968 (West Supp. 1976) ; MONT.
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 84-7401 to 7413 (Smith Supp. 1975) ; N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW
§§ 1850-1870 (McKinney Supp. 1976) ; ORS 469.010-.992 (1975). In addition, the
legislatures in a few states have enacted laws designed primarily to promote the
most plentiful local energy resource or to obtain federal funding for an energy-re-
lated research institute. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. §§ 41-571 to 575 (West Supp.
1976) (solar energy) ; CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 23-41-114 to 115 (Supp. 1976) (ener-
gy-related minerals) ; Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 152.750-.785 (Supp. 1976) (coal).
94 For a list of these states, see notes 95-99 infra. See also 1 NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, TURNING TOWARD THE SUN (1976). The
importance of a tax incentive is apparent when the potential effect of taxation on
the cost competitiveness of solar devices is reduced to numbers. Since such in-
stallations are substantial capital investments, if their value is added to the as-
sessed valuation of a house, a sizable tax increase will result. Thus a tax rate of
3%, i.e., $30 per $1,000 assessed valuation, would add $150 per year to the cost of
a $5,000 collector.
The President's energy program includes a tax incentive for the installation of
solar energy equipment. The proposal would allow a tax credit of 40% of the
initial $1,000 of cost and 25% for the next $6,400. The credit would gradually be
reduced and would expire at the end of 1984. National Energy Policy (Fact Sheet),
supra note 3, at 583. A similar tax credit proposed in 1976 was deleted in confer-
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classes: first, a depreciation allowance for the cost of the solar device ;95
second, the application of a lower rate of taxation to the value of the
collector ;96 third, a property tax exemption for at least part of the pur-
chase and installation cost ;97 fourth, an income tax allowance for part
of the system's cost ;98 and fifth, an exemption from sales taxes. 99 In
addition, at least two states have provided for the modification of build-
ence. Compare Tax Reform Act of 1976, H.R. 10612, § 2002, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976) with I.R.C. §§ 161-220.
95 ARz. REV. STAT. § 43-123.37 (West Supp. 1976) (depreciated over 36
months) ; TEX. TAX-GEN. ANN. art. 12.01(6) (Vernon Supp. 1976) (corporations
only, over a period of not less than 60 months).
96 COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-5-105 (Supp. 1976) (taxed at 5% rather than 30%).
97 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-81(56) (West Supp. 1977), as amended
by Act of June 20, 1977, ch. 77-490, 1977 Conn. Legis. Serv. 866 (exempts difference
in cost of solar and conventional system for fifteen years) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
120, §§ 501d-I to 3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977) (cost difference exempt) ; MAss.
ANN. LAWS ch. 59, § 5(45) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1977) (ten-year tax exemption) ;
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 84-7403 (Smith Supp. 1975) (cost exempt up to
$100,000; over $100,000 taxed at a lower rate) ; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 72:61-64
(Supp. 1975) (cities and towns may exempt cost of solar energy systems) ; Act of
June 28, 1977, ch. 322, 1977 N.Y. Laws 423 (to be codified at N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX
LAW § 487 (McKinney)) (cost difference exempt for 15 years) ; ORS 307.030
(note) (1975) (ten-year exemption of cost difference) ; Act of July 14, 1977, ch.
364, 1977 Wash. Legis. Serv. 1293 (to be codified in WASH. REv. CODE § 34.04
(cost difference exempt)). Arizona, Hawaii, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Ne-
vada, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Vermont also have enacted some form
of property tax exemption.
In addition, Texas has provided incentives for businesses engaged in solar
energy development by exempting receipts from the sale, lease, or rental of solar
devices from taxation. TEX. TAx-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(DD) (Vernon Supp.
1976). Similarly, corporations engaged exclusively in the manufacture, sale, or
installation of solar devices are exempt from the franchise tax. Id. art. 12.03(r).
Montana has also provided for low cost loans to finance the installation of solar
energy systems. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 84-7405 (Smith Supp. 1975). Ore-
gon has increased the maximum loan available under the state's veteran home loan
program by $3,000 to allow the installation of alternate energy systems. Act of
July 11, 1977, ch. 315, 1977 Or. Laws Adv. Sh. pt. 4, at 125.
98 E.g., CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 17052.5 (West Supp. 1977) (income tax
credit of lesser of 10% of cost or $1,000) ; IDAHO CODE § 63-3022C (Supp. 1977)
(income tax reduction of 40% of cost in year of installation, 20% of cost in each
succeeding 3 years) ; KAN. STAT. §§ 79-32,120(c) (v) ; 79-32,166-171 (Supp.
1976) (credit for lesser of 25% of cost or $1,000) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15A-
11.3 (Smith Supp. 1975) (credit of lesser of 25% of cost or $1,000) ; Act of June
15, 1977, ch. 196, 1977 Or. Laws Adv. Sh. pt. 2, at 188 (credit of lesser of 25% of
cost or $1,000). In addition, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Montana,
North Carolina, and Oklahoma have exempted solar devices from sales taxes.
99 E.g., Act of June 20, 1977, ch. 77-457, 1977 Conn. Legis. Serv. 802 (to be
codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-412(dd) (West)) (solar collectors
exempt from sales tax for 5 years). Georgia, Michigan, and Texas also exempt
solar energy systems from sales taxes.
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ing codes to meet solar heating and cooling objectives.' 0
Only two states, however, have demonstrated any recognition of the
problem of solar access. In 1975 the Colorado legislature enacted a
solar easement law. 1° 1 The Act is primarily a recording statute, requir-
ing the easement to be in writing and to include at a minimum the
"vertical and horizontal angles, expressed in degrees, at which the solar
easement extends over the real property subject" to it.
10 2
Also in 1975, the Oregon Legislative Assembly amended the land
use planning and zoning enabling statutes to include the requirement
that county planning commissions consider "natural resources, includ-
ing incident solar energy . . . and utilization thereof" in the formula-
tion of "any comprehensive plan and all zoning, subdivision or other
ordinances."' 1 3 The planning commissions were also given the author-
ity to recommend ordinances "protecting and assuring access to inci-
dent solar energy."' 04
These two approaches, Colorado's reliance upon private action and
Oregon's reliance upon zoning and land use planning, represent the
most acceptable alternatives. While both offer potential advantages,
neither statute effectively provides the assurance of solar access re-
quired to stimulate widespread conversion to solar energy.
10 5
100 California allows cities and counties to specify roof pitch and directional
alignment to facilitate solar retrofitting. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 17959
(West Supp. 1977). Florida requires all single-family residences to be designed
to facilitate future installation of solar water-heating equipment. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 553.87 (West Supp. 1977).
In addition, at least three states have established procedures to set standards
for solar heating and cooling equipment. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-14(8)
(West Supp. 1977) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 377.705 (West Supp. 1977); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 116H.127 (West 1977).
101 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-32.5-101 to 102 (Supp. 1977).
102 Id. § 102(a). A similar measure introduced in Washington died in com-
mittee. See S. 360, 45th Wash. Legis., 1st Extraordinary Session (1977).
103 ORS 215.055(1) (1975).
104 ORS 215.110(2) (1975). The most innovative solar legislation, however,
was inadvertently repealed. An amendment to the city planning requirements
specified that the city "shall not unreasonably restrict construction where site
slope and tree cover make incident solar collection unfeasible, except an existing
solar structure's sun plane shall not be substantially impaired." Act of May 19,
1975, ch. 153, § 4, 1975 Or. Laws 167 (repealed 1975) (emphasis added). When
the same section of the planning law was subsequently amended, and the second
amendment did not reenact the first, an anomalous provision of the Oregon Con-
stitution automatically repealed the first amendment. Interview with Rep. David
Frohnmayer, floor manager of the initial amendment, in Eugene, Oregon (Dec.
20, 1976).
105 While recognizing the ability of a landowner to create a property interest
in solar access, the Colorado statute does not change the common law. In addition,
the measure will increase the cost of solar energy because the landowner seeking
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The most significant legislative attempt to guarantee solar access
was a bill introduced in the 94th United States Congress. 10 6 The bill,
which died in the Banking, Currency, and Housing Committee, pro-
vided in part:
No State or local zoning law, regulation, ordinance, or other
provision may permit the construction of any building or other
object . . . in any location or manner which would obstruct
or otherwise interfere with sunlight necessary for the opera-
tion of any solar heating equipment, solar cooling equipment,
or combined solar heating and cooling equipment which is in
use on any building on the date on which any permit or other
authorization for such construction is issued. 1 7
As a straightforward solution to a complex problem, this bill would have
resolved the question of solar access. It deserved more than the silent
death that it received.
2. Zoning
Because it is widespread, adaptable, and generally accepted, several
commentators have suggested zoning as the most advantageous method
of ensuring solar access.108 A number of municipalities already have
adopted simple solar zoning or building ordinances which protect solar
access. 10 9 It is clearly possible to ensure solar access through such tra-
ditional zoning devices as height limitations and setback requirements.
While the power to zone is not limitless, as an instance of the state's
general police powers local zoning boards traditionally have been al-
lowed broad discretion.1 0 Solar zoning ordinances can easily be drafted
to comply with the requirements of the due process' and equal pro-
to install a solar energy system will be required to purchase easements. See notes
88-89 and accompanying text supra. The Oregon approach also is insufficient be-
cause it fails to create the property interest in sunlight that is necessary to protect
the owner of a solar installation adequately. See notes 29-42 and accompanying
text supra.
106 H.R. 11677, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
10 7 Id. § 2(a).
108 See, e.g., American Bar Foundation, supra note 13, at 18; Eisenstadt & Ut-
ton, note 15 supra; Comment, Securing Solar Energy Rights: Easements, Nui-
sance, or Zoning?, 3 COLUM. J. ENVT'L L. 112 (1976).
109 See, e.g., Eisenstadt & Utton, supra note 15, at 387-89 (reprinting the com-
prehensive zoning plan for Albuquerque and Bernalillo County, Arizona).
11 See, e.g., Feiler, Zoning: A Guide to Judicial Review, 47 J. URB. L. 319
(1969).
"ll Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides, in part, that no state shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
The due process clause has been construed to require that the ordinance be reason-
ably related to a permissible state goal. Sunlight as a source of illumination has
been recognized to be necessary for the public's health and welfare, and ordi-
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tection clauses.11 2 Similarly, such ordinances should not, except in
the most extreme situations, regulate the use of property to the extent
necessary to constitute an unconstitutional taking of property without
just compensation.'
3
Because it is practically possible and constitutionally permissible does
not mean, however, that zoning is a satisfactory solution to the prob-
lem. While the landowner has the limited right that no changes in the
zoning regulations affecting his land be made unless required by the
public interest,11 4 this right falls far short of the vested property inter-
nances designed to secure sunlight have, therefore, been upheld as embodying a
permissible state objective. In Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926),
for example, the Court held that the desire to prevent large buildings from "mo-
nopolizing the rays of the sun which otherwise would fall upon smaller homes"
was a valid state objective. Id. at 394. Similarly, the courts have increasingly
recognized that "[e]sthetic, open space, and environmental considerations are
valid bases for regulation .... Thus, in considering the fairness of the restric-
tions imposed, the burden of the Act upon local owners must be balanced against
the broader interests of the region and the State." Horizon Adirondak Corp. v.
State, 88 Misc. 2d 619, -, 388 N.Y.S.2d 235, 243 (Ct. Cl. 1976). See also Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). Given the relationship between energy and the
general welfare, the promotion of the use of solar energy should also be an ac-
ceptable basis for regulating property.
112 Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The equal
protection clause has been interpreted to require that the classification scheme
employed in the statute not be arbitrary, irrational, or suspect. Because the group
affected by a solar zoning ordinance (all of the landowners within the specified
area) is not on its face a suspect classification, the ordinance would be subject to
only minimum scrutiny. Solar zoning can satisfy this requirement easily.
113 The fifth amendment specifies that "private property [shall not] be taken
for public use without just compensation." By the end of the nineteenth century,
this requirement had been held to be incorporated into the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1896). The
taking issue presents potential difficulties, largely because the scope of what con-
stitutes a taking remains unclear. For the best review of the entire question, see
F. BosSFLMAN, D. CALLIES, & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973).
The possibility of a constitutional challenge is present because solar zoning
would require landowners to surrender the right to develop some of the airspace
superjacent to their land. Such challenges appear unlikely to succeed, however,
because in most cases solar zoning regulations will not reduce the value of land
more than general height limitations, which have been upheld in all but the most
extreme situations. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
114 The very limited value of this doctrine as a means of ensuring access to
solar radiation was enunciated by the Illinois Appellate Court which noted that
the plaintiffs' argument that amendments to the basic Chicago zoning ordinance
which had eliminated sideyard requirements and resulted in a
deprivation of air, light, and ventilation [and] a reduced value for
plaintiffs' property and, thus, the ordinance is invalid. . . . [U]nder
Illinois law one property owner may not acquire a prescriptive or im-
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est necessary to create a solar right.",5
In addition to the lack of a property interest, another major impedi-
ment to the use of zoning to secure solar access is the ease and frequency
with which such ordinances are modified. Since 1960 a majority of the
cities in this country have extensively revised their zoning ordinances,
and less substantial changes occur with greater frequency.116
Zoning is also under attack by those who feel that less centralized
methods of land use control are more effective. 11 7 These critics sug-
gest the use of covenants and private nuisance actions as preferable
alternatives. 118 Unfortunately, neither of these solutions will, by them-
plied right to air, light, or ventilation over the land of another. It
therefore follows that defendants breached no common law duty [and]
[c]onsequently, even though the 1957 Chicago Zoning Ordinance per-
mits defendants to deprive plaintiffs of air, light, ventilation . . . that
ordinance does not change or modify any duty owed to plaintiffs, but
merely reaffirms what has long been the law in Illinois.
Cain v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 26 Ill. App. 3d 574, 579-80, 325 N.E.2d
799, 804 (lst Dist. 1975). See also Baker v. City of Algonac, 39 Mich. App. 526,
198 N.W.2d 13 (1972) ; Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507
P.2d 23 (1973).
115 The Supreme Court has noted that "zoning regulations are not contracts
by the government and may be modified." Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315,
323 (1932). See also Robinson v. City of Los Angeles, 146 Cal. App. 2d 810, 304
P.2d 814 (1956); Zopfi v. City of Wilmington, 273 N.C. 430, 160 S.E.2d 325
(1968) ; Eggebeen v. Sonnenburg, 239 Wis. 213, 1 N.W.2d 84 (1941).
116 Between 1960 and 1967, 54.3% of the cities with populations over 50,000
enacted or substantially revised their zoning laws. During the same period, 63.3%
of the towns with populations between 5,000 and 49,999 took similar action. MAN-
vEL, LocA. LAND AND BUILDING REGULATION 31 (1968) (prepared for the Na-
tional Commission on Urban Problems) (Research Report No. 6). In addition,
local planning and zoning commissions are frequently susceptible to political pres-
sures. See Makeilski, Zoning: Legal Theory and Political Practice, 45 J. URB. L.
1 (1967).
A recent judicial trend may, however, obviate some of the potential problems.
In Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574 (1973), for example, the
Oregon Supreme Court reversed a local zoning commission decision because the
zoning change did not conform to the county's comprehensive land use plan. If
courts continue to view comprehensive plans as embodying the general criteria
against which specific zoning changes are to be measured, an individual might be
able to rely with some confidence on existing zoning classifications. See generally
53 OR. L. REv. 459 (1974).
117 See, e.g., Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules,
and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHL L. Rxv. 681 (1973) ; Siegan, Non-
Zoning in Houston, 13 J.L. & EcoN. 71 (1970) ; Note, Land Use Control in Met-
ropolitan Areas: The Failure of Zoning and a Proposed Alternative, 45 S. CAL.
L. REv. 335 (1972).
118 The paradigm for the majority of these critics is Houston, Texas, the only
major American city without a comprehensive zoning ordinance. It should, how-
ever, be noted that "[a]lthough Houston has no zoning ordinance, it has adopted
some controls over land uses that are ordinarily found in zoning ordinances."
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selves, promote the use of solar energy because they do not create a
property interest in sunlight. 1 9 Lacking such a property interest, zon-
ing and its alternatives are at best interim measures that are incapable
of satisfactorily providing the necessary guarantees.
IV
ALTERNATIVE BASES FOR A SOLAR RIGHT
Both courts and legislatures have the power, skill, and resources to
fashion the property interest that is required to encourage the use of
solar energy. While the alternatives available to each institution differ,
a satisfactory resolution of the problem will necessitate consideration
of similar problems. Ultimately, the different solutions must arrive at
the same point: the creation of a property interest in unobstructed sun-
light.
A. Judicial Solutions
One possible judicial solution is the recognition of an action in nui-
sance for the obstruction of sunlight. Due to the fact that private nui-
sance law requires a balancing of the right to use one's property with
the corresponding duty not to injure others through that use, 20 it is
the traditional common-law method of regulating land usage. As distin-
guished from a public nuisance, 1 21 a private nuisance is essentially an
unreasonable use of land that unreasonably interferes with the use or
Siegan, supra note 117, at 75. These include subdivision controls, minimum lot sizes,
and building lines. In addition, the city was given the authority to enforce re-
strictive covenants as though it was a party to them, TEx. CITIES, TOWNS & VIL-
LAGES CODE ANN. art. 974a-1 (Vernon Supp. 1977), and the power to deny build-
ing permits to proposed uses that would violate such covenants, id. art. 974a-2. In
1976 Houston adopted an extensive solar building code. See HOUSTON,TEX.,
BUILDING CODE ch. 88 (1976).
119 Covenants are unsatisfactory because they will add, perhaps substantially,
to the cost of solar energy. See notes 88-89 and accompanying text supra. With
the abolition of the doctrine of ancient lights (a nuisance action) and the current
limited recognition of a property interest in sunlight, nuisance actions remain
unavailable to the potential solar owner as a method of ensuring solar access.
120 [A] general weighing process . . . must be employed to determine
where the balance of interests lies. An invasion of plaintiff's interest is
unreasonable "unless the utility of the actor's conduct outweighs the
gravity of the harm." Some of the specific factors considered in deter-
mining the interests of the parties are the extent and character of harm
involved; the social value of the respective uses; the suitability of
each use to the character of the locality in which it is conducted; the
ability of the defendant or plaintiff to prevent or avoid the harm.
Gronn v. Rogers Constr., Inc., 221 Or. 226, 232-33, 350 P.2d 1086, 1089 (1960)
(citations omitted).




enjoyment of another's property. 122 Liability is predicated upon an
interference that is unreasonable and an injury that is substantial. 12
These principles are effectuated by balancing the gravity of the harm
against the utility of the activity.
124
Although these rules are readily applicable to the obstruction of light,
and light is similar to other interests that can be protected by nuisance
actions, 125 courts generally have refused to apply traditional nuisance
analysis to the obstruction of light. The decisions are marked by a
notable lack of analysis. Courts frequently beg the question 126 by mak-
ing a leap of logic from the rejection of the doctrine of ancient lights
to the general conclusion that there is no right to light: "if the light
and air be shut off damage may result .. . but it is damnum absque
injuria. It is damage which the law does not recognize because there is
no injury. Where there is no right, a deprivation works no injury.'
27
Limitations on the use of land to ensure access to light under nui-
1
22 See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 89 (4th ed. 1971) ; RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 822 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
123 E.g., Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Or. 336, 198 P.2d 847
(1948) ; Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wash. 2d 249, 248 P.2d
380 (1952).
124 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826-828 (Tent. Draft
No. 17, 1971).
125 Nuisance law has been held applicable to foul odors, Higgins v. Decorah
Produce Co., 214 Iowa 276, 242 N.W. 109 (1932) ; Alfred Jacobshagen Co. v.
Dockery, 243 Miss. 511, 139 So. 2d 632 (1962), vibrations, Transcontinental Gas
Pipe Line Corp. v. Gault, 198 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1952) ; Sam Warren & Son
Stone Co. v. Gruesser, 307 Ky. 98, 209 S.W.2d 817 (1948), smoke, dust, or gases,
Menolascino v. Superior Felt & Bedding Co., 313 Ill. App. 557, 40 N.E.2d 813
(1942) ; Dill v. Dance Freight Lines, 247 S.C. 159, 146 S.E.2d 574 (1966), loud
noises, Kentucky & W. Va. Power Co. v. Anderson, 288 Ky. 501, 156 S.W.2d 857
(1941) ; Guarina v. Bogart, 407 Pa. 307, 180 A.2d 557 (1962), excessive light,
Hansen v. Independent School Dist., 61 Idaho 109, 98 P.2d 959 (1940) ; Shel-
burne, Inc. v. Crossnan Corp., 95 N.J. Eq. 188, 122 A. 749 (1923), and high tem-
peratures, Grady v. Wolsner, 46 Ala. 381 (1871).
126 The flaw in the courts' reasoning is that it reverses the logical order of the
argument. The statement that there is no right to light should be the conclusion,
rather than the first premise. Instead of avoiding the question, courts should
apply traditional nuisance analysis and compare the utility of the actor's conduct
with the resulting harm.
127 Musumeci v. Leonardo, 77 R.I. 255, 260, 75 A.2d 175, 177-78 (1950) ; cf.
Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 22 Cal. App. 3d 116, 127, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 350, 357 (1971) ("[A] structure is not a nuisance merely because it ob-
structs the passage of light and air to the building of the adjoining owner."). The
application of nuisance laws is not, however, static. One author has noted: "Auto-
mobiles when they first appeared were nuisances to horse travel; as cars began
to swamp horsedrawn vehicles in number, horses were properly perceived as the
nuisance." Ellickson, supra note 117, at 731. As the use of solar energy increases,
it is possible that courts will view shadows as nuisances.
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sance law have been imposed in only one instance. While courts initially
held that a landowner could erect any structure that was not a nuisance
per se, s2 8 most now recognize an exception to this rule: if the structure
serves no useful purpose and was erected for a malicious motive, the
structure is a nuisance. 129 It is unfortunate that courts have been un-
willing to extend this precedent and to balance the advantages and dis-
advantages from obstructing sunlight as in a normal nuisance case.
The large number of potential remedies'3 0 gives nuisance law sub-
stantial flexibility and allows courts to tailor the remedy to the facts
of the case. This flexibility would permit courts to protect both a right
to sunlight and the conflicting desire to develop one's land.
B. Legislative Solutions
While courts are capable of responding to the need to protect solar
access, the fact that the prevailing property rights structure is biased
against such rights' 3 ' makes the legislative branch the most suitable in-
stitution to resolve the complex factual and policy problems that are
involved. Litigation is a slow, costly, and uncertain method of reform.
A satisfactory resolution of the problem may be reached, but only at
the expense of numerous litigants and false starts. Given the lack of fa-
vorable precedents and their tepid support of a right to light, courts
may be unwilling to develop the necessary doctrines. Even if they are
willing, the time required to resolve the myriad details will impede the
use of solar energy.
12
8 The courts' reasoning was the same as that now employed in denying a
nuisance action for obstruction of light: because there was no invasion of a pro-
tected interest, the construction of a structure did not become actionable solely be-
cause of the motive of the builder. E.g., Ingwersen v. Barry, 118 Cal. 342, 50 P.
536 (1897) ; Guest v. Reynolds, 68 Ill. 478 (1873) ; Mahan v. Brown, 13 Wend.
261 (N.Y. 1835) ; Harrison v. Langlinais, 312 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
129 The leading case is Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 37 N.W. 838 (1888). See
also Sundowner, Inc. v. King, 95 Idaho 367, 509 P.2d 785 (1973) ; Hibbard v.
Halliday, 59 Okla. 244, 158 P. 1158 (1916). For a good history of the development
of the modern rule, see Note, The Effect of Motive upon Actionability in the Exer-
cise of Rights in Real Property-Spite Wells and Spite Fences, 11 VA. L. REV.
122 (1924). Several jurisdictions have also statutorily abrogated the common-law
rule. E.g., Ma REv. STAT. tit. 17, § 2801 (1965) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-10-20
(1970) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 280.08 (West 1958).
While most courts continue to insist that the structure serves no useful purpose,
at least one court has indicated a willingness to adopt the general nuisance tests
in relation to spite fences: "That the invasion of another's interest may be of
some benefit to the actor makes in itself no difference. That is not the criterion.
The criterion is as to whether or not the benefit exceeds the harm done." Schork
v. Epperson, 74 Wyo. 286, 293-94, 287 P.2d 467, 470 (1955).
130 Potential remedies include abatement, injunction, damages, contempt, and
declaratory judgment. See generally Comment, Nuisance as a Modern Mode of
Land Use Control, 46 WASH. L. REv. 47 (1970).
131 See notes 30-31 and accompanying text supra.
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On the other hand, legislatures can minimize these potential difficul-
ties. They can quickly and effectively create a structure capable of
providing the necessary solar guarantees. In addition, by manipulating
the presumptions and procedures attached to the right, legislatures can
effectively balance the competing interests. A number of potential meth-
ods exist to create the requisite solar right.
1. Zoning and Transferable Development Rights
While, as noted above, 132 zoning is an unsatisfactory method of pro-
viding solar access, one recent adaptation of zoning, the transferable
development right (TDR) concept, is a potential means of creating a
minimal solar right.
In a TDR system, land ownership is divided into two components:
ownership of the physical land and ownership of the development po-
tential traditionally associated with land. Under this approach, an initial
level of permissible development is specified; this becomes the standard
against which all development is compared. If the local zoning board
determines that a tract of land may be developed to a density lower
than the standard, the owner of the land thus designated is permitted
to sell the unusable development potential. The owner may sell this
TDR to either a landowner in an area which the zoning board has speci-
fied for higher than normal development 13 3 or to the municipality which
can then resell the TDR.13 4 This approach has been embraced eagerly
by planning officials as a more equitable and inexpensive method of land
use control.
13 5
The TDR concept can be applied to solar access problems through
the creation of a transferable solar right (TSR). To initiate this sys-
tem, the local zoning board would specify a base level of insolation to
which a landowner would be entitled. 136 Certain areas, such as resi-
132 See notes 114-19 and accompanying text supra.
133 The landowner in the area designated for more intensive development is re-
quired to purchase a TDR for any development that will exceed the standard level
of development specified for the entire municipality. A system of this type is cur-
rently in use in New York City. Schnidman, Transferable Development Rights:
An Idea in Search of Implementation, 11 LAND & WATER REV. 339, 356 n.4 (1975).
Similar systems are used in Collier County, Florida and Buckingham Township,
Pennsylvania. Id. at 360-61, 368-72. See also 82 YALE L.J. 338 (1972).
134 This variation is employed in Chicago. The city has created a "develop-
ments right bank" from which it sells the TDRs. For the general enabling statute,
see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 11-48.2-1 to 7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977). The
operation of the system is described in Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive
Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L, REV. 574 (1972).
135 See, e.g., AMERICAN SOC'Y OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, TRANSFERABLE DE-
VELOPMENT RIGHTS (1975) (Planning Advisory Serv. Rep. No. 304); Baker,
Development Rights Transfer and Landmark Preservation-Providing a Sense
of Orientation, 9 URB. L. ANN. 131 (1975).
136 The base level could be specified either in terms of a minimum number of
hours of insolation or, its obverse, a maximum amount of solar obstruction.
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dential neighborhoods, would then be zoned for a greater amount of
sunlight, while others, such as commercial or industrial districts, would
be zoned for a smaller amount. An owner who wished to construct a
building in one of the latter areas that would obstruct more than the
base level of insolation would be required to purchase enough TSRs
from owners in residential areas to cover the amount of obstruction
above the base level.13 7 Thus the residential owner would be compen-
sated for the loss of the potential to obstruct sunlight.
A TSR system presents potential problems, however. The initial re-
ception in the courts of the TDR concept has been lukewarm at best.
While upholding the plans against general constitutional challenges, in
most cases courts have held the law to result in an unconstitutional
taking as applied to the particular parcel. 138 A TSR system presents
similar problems.
In addition, it is unclear whether courts would recognize the specifi-
cation of the base level entitlement as a de facto property interest or as
merely a zoning specification. If it is treated as the latter, the TSR
approach offers no greater assurances than does zoning alone.
The constitutional questions, the uncertainty of courts' treatment of
the base level insolation entitlement, and the fact that the decisions on
the level of the entitlement and the location of high insolation districts
remain with the local zoning boards all suggest that a TSR system may
be insufficient to provide the necessary guarantees of solar access.
2. Nuisance
The creation of a statutory nuisance action for the interruption of
sunlight is a more satisfactory solution than zoning or TSR systems.
Because a public nuisance is "an unreasonable interference with a
right common to the public,"' 13 9 it is a particularly appropriate method
137 For example, a municipality could decide that four hours of sunlight was
to be the base level, with residential areas zoned for six hours and industrial
areas for only two hours. A landowner who decided to construct a building in an
industrial district which would obstruct six hours of sunlight would be required
to purchase an aggregate TSR for two hours for the proposed building.
138s Compare Lutheran Church v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d, 316 N.E.2d
305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974), Fred R. French Investing Co. v. City of New York,
77 Misc. 2d 199, 352 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. 1973), and In re Sailor's Snug Harbor
v. Platt, 29 A.D.2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1968) (holding
the restriction to be a taking for which the potential sale of the TDR was not
"just compensation") with Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 50
A.D.2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (upholding the applica-
tion of the statute to Grand Central Station). See also Note, The Unconstitu-
tionality of Transferable Development Rights, 84 YALE L.J. 1101 (1975).
139 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1) (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 121, § 88. It is not necessary that the entire
community be affected by the nuisance. It is enough that the action will interfere
with those who come into contact with it in the exercise of a public right. See,
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of prohibiting conduct that is contrary to the public interest. The des-
ignation of an act as a nuisance is a utilization of the states' general
police powers.1 40 As such, the doctrines which limit its applicability are
the same as those which restrict the use of zoning.1 4 1 It should, there-
fore, be constitutionally permissible to proceed in this manner.
By enacting a statute creating a nuisance action for the obstruction
of sunlight, a legislature would be protecting a solar right. If the stat-
ute conditioned the availability of the action on a requirement, for exam-
ple, that the sunlight be used by a solar collector that provides a specified
minimum of a structure's heating needs,1 42 one of the major fears-
that solar energy will be used as a ruse to halt all development 1 43 -
could be obviated.
The use of public nuisance law to ensure solar access, however, has
at least two limitations. First, the mere availability of such actions has
often proved ineffective. Due to the fact that only a public official may
bring an action to enforce the statute, the legislative intent may be cir-
e.g., State v. Hooker, 87 N.W.2d 337 (N.D. 1957) ; Finkelstein v. City of Sapulpa,
106 Okla. 297, 234 P. 187 (1925).
140 Most states have statutes designating certain actions or situations to be
public nuisances. See, e.g., ORS 602.040 (1975) (apiaries with diseased bees) ;
ORS 616.225 (1975) (unsafe food) ; ORS 452.615 (1975) (the tansy ragwort
plant). It is also possible to include in such statutes a private right of action to
sue under the statute. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 60.05 West 1969) ; WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 7.48.210 (West 1961) ; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 280.02 (West 1958).
See also Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997 (1966).
141 The primary potential restriction on the use of public nuisance law is the
general requirement that the police power be used only to further the public in-
terest. As one study noted, this should present no problems: although a solar ease-
ment "will have a direct effect on only one or two individuals and their solar col-
lectors, there should be far-reaching benefits for the entire community. The de-
velopment of solar energy use promises less air pollution, reduced use of land and
water for energy facilities, and conservation of conventional energy sources."
Region IX Counsel's Office, supra note 12, at 45. Justice Brandeis noted,
"[TIhe purpose of a restriction does not cease to be public, because incidentally
some private persons may-thereby receive gratuitously valuable special benefits.
Thus, owners of low buildings may obtain, through statutory restrictions upon
the height of neighboring structures, benefits equivalent to an easement of light
and air." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417-18 (1922) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting). Due process and equal protection requirements must also be
satisfied, and the ordinance must not result in a taking. See generally notes 110-13
and accompanying text supra; see also Comment, Nuisance-As a "Taking" of
Property, 17 U. MIAMI L. REv. 537 (1963).
142 " [Property interests] are created and their dimensions are defined by exist-
ing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law
-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of
entitlement to those benefits." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)
(emphasis added). See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) ; Arnett v. Ken-
nedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
143 Interview with Rep. David Frohnmayer, note 104 supra.
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cumvented if the officials are unwilling or unable to bring suit. 4 4 Sec-
ond, the requirement that, if an individual is to bring an action for a
public nuisance the individual must have suffered a harm that is differ-
ent in kind rather than degree than that suffered by the public, 1 45 is a
potential impediment.1 46 While the injury to the owner of a solar
energy system clearly is different from that suffered by the public (and
the solar owner should thus be able to bring an action under the com-
mon-law principles), it would be advantageous to include a provision in
the statute which allows an individual to bring a suit for the obstruction
of sunlight.
47
The designation of the obstruction of sunlight as a public nuisance
thus offers a practical means of guaranteeing solar access. By manipu-
lating the presumptions and procedural methods contained in the stat-
ute, a legislature can balance the competing interests effectively.
3. Solar Rights Laws
The enactment of a statute designed specifically to provide a solar
right is probably the most satisfactory solution to the problem of en-
suring solar access. Due to the fact that the legislative process requires
the recognition and consideration of potential problems, it is the best
method of resolving them effectively with a minimum of uncertainty
and expense. There are a number of possible models which, while creat-
ing a solar right, provide varying degrees of protection for the right
created. These models can be used to balance the competing interests
with considerable sophistication by altering the presumptions and con-
ditions attached to the right.
One potential model is found in Japanese law. By municipal ordi-
nance in both Tokyo and Osaka, a landowner has a presumptive right
to sunlight which is an incident of the ownership of land. 14 Japanese
144 See, e.g., Hill, The Politics of Air Pollution: Public Interest and Pressure
Groups, 10 ARIZ. L. REV. 37 (1968).
145 See, e.g., Reynolds Metal Co. v. Martin, 337 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1964)
Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 22 Cal. App. 3d 116, 99 Cal. Rptr. 350
(1971) ; Boomer v. Atlantic Portland Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870
(1970). See also Keeton & Morris, Notes on "Balancing the Equities," 18 TEx. L.
REV. 412 (1940).
146 Where to draw the line between cases where the injury is more general
or more equally distributed, and cases where it is not, where, by reason
of local situation the damage is comparatively much greater to a special
few, is often a difficult task. In spite of all the refinements and distinc-
tions which have been made, it is often a mere matter of degree ....
Kaje v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O.R.R., 57 Minn. 422, 424, 59 N.W. 493, 493 (1894).
147 Several statutes that create public nuisances include a section allowing
an individual to bring suit. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 60.05(1) (West 1969) ;
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 57-110 (1969); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 280.02 (West
1958).
148 Tokumoto, 490 JURISTo 29 (1971).
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courts have been willing to enforce this right despite the fact that it
can substantially restrict development. 49 In 1975 official compensa-
tion standards were promulgated by the Central Liaison Council on
Land. The standards "apply to those homes which have had sunlight
in winter cut down to less than four hours per day."'150 The Japanese
parliament has also proposed a statute modeled on the Tokyo ordi-
nance that would apply only to residential districts, thus limiting the
adverse impact on land development.' 5 '
Another statute could be modeled on the English right to light.
15 2
A legislature could provide that the right to uninterrupted sunlight
vests after a prescriptive period runs. Due to the length of time required
for prescription, this option would restrict development considerably
less than the creation of a presumptive right to light. It would also pro-
vide a less certain guarantee of solar access, however.'5 3
A third model is the race-notice system of land registration used in a
number of states in this country. Under this system, the first pur-
chaser of land to record the purchase acquires priority over any unre-
corded earlier purchasers. 5 4 Modified to provide a solar right, this pro-
cedure would vest a right to sunlight in the first person to file a notice
of intent to install a solar collector. This notice would be effective against
all structures for which building permits had not been issued. The
statute could require that the notice be filed on all land that would be
affected by the solar right, thus simplifying title search requirements.
Another potential model is natural resource law. Two resources
149 In Tokyo, for example, a business executive obtained an injunction prohib-
iting the construction of an eight-story building that would have obstructed three
hours of winter sunlight. The Japan Times (Tokyo), Dec. 15, 1974, at 2, col. 5.
See also id. June 16, 1974, at 2, col. 5.
1 50 Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), Sept. 17, 1975, at 1.
151 The Japan Times (Tokyo), Dec. 15, 1974, at 2, col. 5.
152 See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
153 The statute could also incorporate the interruption-by-filing concept em-
bodied in the Rights of Light Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 56, §§ 2, 3 (1959). Such
a provision would be similar to an early Massachusetts statute, which provided in
part:
no right shall by lapse of time accrue ... to have any privilege of
air, or light ... from, in, upon or over the land of any other person
• .. in any case in which the owner or owners of such land ... shall
have caused to be recorded in the Registry of Deeds . . . before the time
when such right would otherwise by law have accrued, a notification of
his, her or their intention thereby to prevent the accruing of such right.
Act of Feb. 8, 1825, ch. 52, 1825 Mass. Act 486.
154 Under a race-notice land registration statute a subsequent purchaser or
assignee of an interest in land will acquire priority in the land if the party has
both a lack of notice of other unrecorded interests and priority of registration. See,
e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 291 (McKinney 1968); ORS 92.640 (1975).
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have been suggested as suitable analogues, petroleum and water. 155 Of
the two, water is the preferable model because of the similarities of the
two resources.156 An effective solar rights law can readily be based upon
the prior appropriation doctrine common in the western states.157
While details vary among jurisdictions, a composite statement of the
appropriation procedure is that it "requires an intent to appropriate,
notice of the appropriation, compliance with state laws, a diversion of
the water from a natural stream, and its application, with reasonable




Application of this model to solar energy would require the creation
of a state agency to oversee the acquisition of solar rights. When a land-
155 See American Bar Foundation, supra note 13, at 18.
150 While there are similarities between petroleum and sunlight (for example
'both must be "captured" and processed), there are several drawbacks to the use
'of petroleum law as a model for solar legislation. First, the peculiar nature of
-petroleum has created substantial difficulties in determining the nature of the own-
ership interest in the resource. See generally 1 E. KuNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF GAS AND OIL §§ 2.2, 2.4, 3.1-.2 (1962). It has also led to complex leas-
ing arrangements. Id. § 15.9; 2 id. § 18.2. Second, because not all states have petro-
leum deposits, a majority of jurisdictions are unfamiliar with petroleum law.
Third, oil and gas taxation law is intertwined inextricably with the law governing
its development.
Unlike petroleum, both sunlight and water are nondepletable resources. While
the use of sunlight, like irrigation, is consumptive, the consumption does not de-
crease the amount that will be available for future use. Similarly, it is the use of
both sunlight and water that is economically advantageous. See generally W.
HUTCHINS, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST
27-29 (1942) ; note 34 supra. Thus, on the whole, water law offers a more suitable
analogy than that developed for petroleum.
There are two basic systems of water law in this country. The more humid
eastern states generally have adopted the common law doctrine of riparian rights
where the "owner of land that is riparian to a waterbody [i.e., is adjacent to it]
has the right to have the waterbody continue to stand or flow along his land, sub-
ject to the right of other riparian owners to make reasonable use of the waters."
7 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 610 (1976). The more arid western
states, on the other hand, developed a new body of law that stresses the "beneficial
use of water, not land ownership, [as] the basis of the right to water, and that
priority of use, not equality of right, is the basis of the division of water among
appropriators." F. TRELEASE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 2 (1967).
The distinction between the two doctrines is becoming less important, however,
as water becomes a scarce resource in the riparian jurisdictions. A number of these
states are establishing permit systems. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-1 to 53
(1972). This trend seems likely to continue because the National Water Commis-
sion, following a detailed study of the nation's water resources and require-
ments, recommended the general adoption of such a system. NATIONAL WATER
COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 280 (1973).
157 For a more detailed analysis of this model as applied to solar energy, see
Comment, note 15 supra.




owner is prepared to construct a solar collector, application for a solar
permit would be made to the agency. Following the issuance of a tem-
porary permit, the landowner would have a reasonable time in which
to install the necessary equipment. If the landowner complied with the
requirements of the act, a final permit would be issued after an inspec-
tion of the completed installation. 59 This final permit would be tanta-
mount to a recognized property interest in the use of sunlight.
A major advantage of using water law as the model is the large body
of case law available as precedent. This body of case law will help
courts and administrative agencies avoid inconsistent and unsatisfac-
tory decisions because the economic and policy considerations involved
in the use of both resources are analogous.
Each of these alternatives can be varied substantially in both form
and substance by the inclusion of limiting conditions in the statute cre-
ating the solar right. By allowing the municipality to condemn the solar
right in the process of issuing a building permit, for example, a legisla-
ture could provide a method which, while allowing continued develop-
ment of land, would also protect the interest of the owner of a solar
energy system. 16° In addition, the vesting of the right could be condi-
tioned upon the use of sunlight for heating, cooling, or electrical gen-
eration, upon specified efficiency standards for the equipment, or upon
related criteria. 161 The inclusion of such conditions will allow a legis-
lature to tailor the right to the local situation.
While other legal doctrines, such as nuisance law, can be expanded
to cover the novel problems involved in encouraging solar energy
utilization, the creation of a body of law designed specifically for this
purpose is the most advantageous solution. The creation of a statutory
framework to protect solar access will reduce the uncertainty and delay
159 The inclusion of a condemnation right would prevent costly holdouts by
owners of sun rights in urban areas, while also establishing a property interest in
the use of sunlight. Decisions to allow higher density development would thus allow
condemnation awards which would include the value of sunlight as an energy
resource, thus ensuring that the solar owner would be compensated. By passing
the cost of the award along to the builder as part of the building permit fee, the
system would require the builder to include the potential cost of the sunlight in
the cost computations for the proposed structure. This would encourage the build-
er to construct the building in a manner which obstructed a minimum amount of
sunlight, thus reducing the amount of the condemnation award and of the building
permit fee.
160 By conditioning the right on such factors as the location of the collectors or
a requirement that they provide a minimum percentage of the building heating
needs, frivolous litigation would be avoided, and more efficient use of solar energy
would be encouraged. See also note 141 supra.
161 Cf. University of Idaho Water Resources Research Institute, Modern
Problems in Water Allocation 7 (n.d.) (the requirements for a valid appropri-
ation).
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that would occur from a piecemeal extension of other doctrines. Thus,
if this country wishes to avoid the serious economic consequences of
the energy crisis without sacrificing the environment, the enactment
of solar rights statutes is vital. The large number of potential models
for such a statute will allow legislatures to select a procedure that will
balance the need for solar energy with the desired level of development.
CONCLUSION
The lack of a recognized property interest in the use of sunlight is an
impediment to widespread conversion to solar energy. Current legal
theories which treat sunlight as a source of illumination rather than as
an energy resource are not capable of resolving the potential problems.
There is, therefore, a need to revise the present system of property
rights so that it encourages, rather than retards, the use of solar energy.
The alternative solutions to this problem are varied. This variety will
allow each jurisdiction to determine the most suitable method of pro-
viding the necessary solar right in light of its climate, building patterns,
and other factors.
One authority has commented:
There's going to be a tremendous need for revision of the legal
system soon. That is, if we are serious about the economy and
the need to find new forms of energy such as solar, the legal
policies and institutions are going to have to be considerably
reshaped and revamped .... 162
Now is the time to begin.
DALE D. GOBLE*
162 American Bar Foundation, supra note 13, at 22 (statement of Charles M.
Haar).
* Third-year student, School of Law, University of Oregon.
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